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ABSTRACT

An inherently managerial commitment, functionalist/positivist theoretical
orientation, and Western/U.S. bias characterize the dominant stream of crisis
communication research and scholarship in the United States. These characteristics
render analysis and assessment of crisis and crisis communication especially in nonWestern settings somewhat limited in scope and coverage. This limitation becomes all
the more apparent when crisis is conceptualized as a social phenomenon, not merely an
organizational one. Such conceptualization decenters the organization as the sole source
of power to initiate crisis response and management, foregrounds the discursive terrain
related to a crisis whereby multiple sources compete with their respective realities about
the crisis, and thus challenges the dominant organization-centered logic of crisis
communication research and scholarship in the U.S.
This thesis presents a postcolonial theory-driven critical discourse analysis of
news coverage on the collapse of a multistoried garment factory building in Bangladesh,
which killed more than 1,100 people and wounded more than 2,000 others, and its
aftermath, by two newspapers each from the United Kingdom, United States, and
Bangladesh. The analysis illustrates how (re)conceptualizing crisis as social phenomenon
and crisis communication as discourse destabilizes certain taken-for-granted assumptions
that undergird the dominant crisis communication scholarship and research in the U.S.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Two contrasting features, namely, a rapid proliferation of research and a slow
pace of theory building, have marked the emergence of crisis communication as “a
distinctive area of study” (Coombs, 2010, p. 477). The modern history of crisis
communication began with the “notoriety created by Johnson & Johnson Company’s
successful handling of the Tylenol scare in 1982” (Heath & O’Hair, 2009, p. 5). In more
than 30 years since, although the number of published works on crisis communication has
increased significantly (An & Cheng, 2012; Ha & Boynton, 2014), theory building has
been slow (Fisherman, 1999). Debates continue as to if there is or should be a unique and
independent crisis literature, and disagreements about the usefulness of proposing a
unifying metatheory for crisis communication research remain largely unresolved (Heath,
2012). Meanwhile, certain theories (e.g., situational crisis communication theory, image
restoration theory, apologia theory) have frequently been, and continue to be, cited while
many published works do not even propose research questions or hypotheses based on
theories (An & Cheng, 2012). Falkheimer and Heide (2006) also complained of an
absence of “systemic knowledge and theoretical framework analysis” (p. 180) in crisis
communication research. As such, I argue, mainstream crisis communication research in
the United States has remained somewhat limited in its scope and coverage, especially in
respect of analyzing and assessing crisis communication in a non-Western setting.
I begin with a review of different definitions of crisis and crisis communication,
arguing that these definitions project unidimensional and unidirectional views, and are

2

designed and deployed primarily to protect the interest of an organization in crisis. Then,
I proceed with an examination of the trends in contemporary crisis communication
research, tracing its roots in, and tying its modus operandi with, public relations research.
Here, I also discuss how mainstream research on public relations, and subsequently crisis
communication, in the U.S. has taken a distinctively different route than the one taken by
organizational communication research. The discussion is relevant because of the use of
organizational communication as an expansive term to cover any type of communication
that the organization engages in, including public relations and crisis communication
(Johansson, 2007). This difference in research trends, I argue, is constitutive of certain
biases that characterize dominant crisis communication research and scholarship in the
U.S. Later, I articulate the purpose of the thesis, and introduce the case I will analyze for
the thesis, and explain the reasons why I have chosen it. Finally, I detail the chapter
outline for the thesis.
Definitions of Crisis and Crisis Communication
Multiple definitions of crisis have emerged over the years; however, each
conceptualization shares certain common assumptions. Fearn-Banks (1996/2002) defined
crisis as “a major occurrence with a potentially negative outcome affecting the
organization, company, or industry, as well as its publics, products, services or good
name” that “interrupts normal business transactions and can sometimes threaten the
existence of the organization” (p. 2). Seeger, Sellnow, and Ulmer (2003) viewed crisis as
“a specific, unexpected, non-routine event or series of events which creates high levels of
uncertainty, and significant or perceived threat to an organization’s high priority goals”
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(p. 7). Meanwhile, Heath (1995) defined crisis as risk manifested or, in other words, the
fallout of a risk either ignored or not effectively addressed. Hearit and Courtright (2003)
summarized crisis as “a generally predictable series of events that occurs when an
organization’s values are under assault by an external agent or there is a perception that
an organization has committed some wrongdoing” (p. 83). A common theme that
emerges from these definitions, despite their different points of emphasis, is that a crisis
disrupts an organization’s normal operations and compromises its reputation.
Similarly, the varying definitions of crisis communication also have common
themes across each conceptualization. Fearn-Banks (1996/2002) defined crisis
communication as “the dialog between the organization and its publics prior to, during,
and after the negative occurrence” that is “designed to minimize damage to the image of
the organization” (p. 2). Notably, public in crisis communication does not mean people in
general; public or publics in crisis communication denote certain groups of people (e.g.,
employees, customers, stakeholders, board members) on whom an organization
“depends… for survival because they have some stake in the organization” (p. 3).
Coombs (2012) defined crisis communication as “the collection, processing, and
dissemination of information required to address a crisis situation” (p. 20). Seeger and
Sellnow (2013), on the other hand, argued that crisis communication could be understood
as “the ongoing process of creating shared meaning among and between groups,
communities, individuals and agencies, within the ecological context of a crisis, for the
purpose of preparing for and reducing, limiting and responding to threats and harms”
(p. 13). These definitions are built on the assumption that crisis communication is a
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practice and strategy intended to protect and promote, and repair and restore the
image/reputation of a crisis-hit organization.
A key concept that characterizes the definition of both crisis and crisis
communication is perception. For example, Coombs (2009) suggested that crisis is
“largely perceptual” and that “[i]f stakeholders believe there is a crisis, the organization is
in a crisis unless it can successfully persuaders it is not” (p. 99). Thus, he postulated crisis
communication as a practice that seeks to “influence how the stakeholders react to the
crisis and the organization in crisis” (p. 100). Hearit and Courtright (2003) also
emphasized the perceptual dimension in their postulation of crisis communication in
terms of “terminological influence” to “symbolically ‘resolve’ the crisis by
argumentatively altering perceptions in a manner favorable to organizational interests”
(p. 83). Inherent in these definitions is the recognition that multiple perceptions exist
surrounding a crisis event but the emphasis, again, is to ensure that only one of these
perceptions prevails, the one that favors the organization’s interest.
Overall, the different definitions of both crisis and crisis communication have at
their core an overarching concern and consideration for the organization’s interests. This
centrality of the organization’s interests in crisis communication and crisis
communication research, as I discuss in the next section, is an inheritance from public
relations and public relations research.
Trends in Crisis Communication Research
Crisis communication remains essentially an extension of public relations as an
area of both practice and research. Fearn-Banks (2009) observed that crisis has generally
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driven the profession of public relations and that most public relations programs are
about either recovering from or preventing a crisis. Moreover, a great deal of crisis
communication scholarship draws on public relations research and practices (Coombs,
2012; Falkheimer & Heide, 2006), and a sizeable majority of crisis communication
research is produced by academic experts on public relations and corporate reputation
(Heath, 2012). It is, thus, important to contextualize crisis communication research within
the broader discipline of public relations (Coombs, 2010). Such a contextualization is
also necessary to understand the public relations focus in crisis communication research,
which, I argue, is at the heart of some of its other biases. At the same time, it is necessary
as well to distinguish public relations and crisis communication research from
organizational communication research. Although organizational communication is
generally understood to be an umbrella term for whatever communication that an
organization engages in, including public relations and crisis communication, public
relations and crisis communication research has taken a distinctively different route from
organizational communication research. The difference is discussed in the next section.
Disconnect between Organizational Communication and Public Relations Research
Organizational communication research barely provides the context for
understanding the trend in public relations research. Public relations, in fact, has had little
to no space in organizational communication research. Most organizational
communication scholars have maintained a distinction between communication within
and beyond the organization, regarding “most communication aimed at external
audiences…as alien to the field” (Cheney & Christensen, 2001a, p. 231; emphasis in
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original). They also dismissed public relations as “too closely tied with a particular
profession” (Cheney & Christensen, 2001b, p. 170). Questions and concerns of
professionals and practitioners have always driven the public relations research agenda,
and professionals and practitioners predominantly conducted early public relations
research (Karlberg, 1996). Moreover, public relations research has often been sponsored
and thus seen as “wed to the self-interest of specific clients” (p. 265). These reasons
could well explain the historical reluctance of many organizational communication
scholars to associate with, let alone own, public relations.
That said, public relations scholars are no less to blame for the “lack of
interaction, networking, and cross-fertilization of ideas” because they “have tended to
avoid contact with organizational communication, at conferences as well as in the pages
of communication journals” (Cheney & Christensen, 2001b, p. 170). This preference for
a closed network may be a reason why “[p]robably more than any other subdivision of
communication, public relations has developed its own specialized journals, professional
and scholarly associations, publishers, and network of collaborative relationships” (Botan
& Taylor, 2004, p. 646). Subsequently, with public relations researchers rarely publishing
their works in other journals, communication and mass communication researchers have
not had wide access to public relation scholarship and the erroneous understanding of
public relations as “an applied technical area” has persisted.
Of late, though, communication scholars, especially in Europe, have begun to
argue against the internal-external communication divide in general and the
organizational communication-public relations disconnect in particular, postulating
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“strategic communication” as a “transboundary concept that captures the complex
phenomenon of an organization’s targeted communication processes” (Falkheimer &
Heide, 2014, p. 124). Yet, this counterintuitive and counterproductive mutual exclusivity
continues to characterize the relationship, or lack thereof, between organizational
communication and public relations research. Moreover, public relations research has
also had a distinctively different theoretical orientation than that of organizational
communication. It has typically had a functionalist approach with the focus on
“techniques and production of strategic organizational messages” (Botan & Taylor, 2004,
p. 651). This functionalist theoretical approach has also been transferred to crisis
communication research and scholarship because of its predominantly public relations
focus, which is discussed in the next section.
Public Relations Focus
To understand the public relations focus in crisis communication research, it is
first necessary to examine the conceptualization of public relations in contemporary
scholarship. Berger (1999) likened the conceptualization of public relations with “a
process intended to construct an ideological worldview… a self-interested and partial
representation of the world based on a particular set of beliefs, ideas, attitudes, and
objectives” (p. 186). Most organizations, as Grunig (1989) argued, seek to construct a
worldview where they know best and where the public “would willingly ‘cooperate’ with
the organization” if they “had ‘the big picture’ or understood the organization,” and
should do so for their own benefit (p. 32). So, the objective is to create ‘the big picture’
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or, to put it differently, the organization’s version of the reality, and persuade publics into
buying it.
Crisis communication apparently has a similar focus: propagating a ‘big picture’
that minimizes or condones an organization’s responsibility and/or culpability for a crisis.
The emphasis is on “strategies and processes that organizations ought to take to secure
favorable positions in times of crisis” (Kim & Dutta, 2009) and “avoid legal sanctions
and punitive damages” (Waymer & Heath, 2007, p. 88). The transference of the public
relations focus to crisis communication research is largely due to the fact that crisis
communication scholars are “mostly based in public relations” and interested in
“protecting and defending an organization’s reputation” (Falkheimer & Heide, 2009,
p. 56). In other words, with public relations scholars conducting much of the research,
crisis communication is bound to have a public relations focus.
Informal vs. Formal Research
That questions and concerns of professionals and practitioners have driven the
research agenda has also been a contributive factor. In fact, as Coombs (2012) noted,
practitioners authored initial crisis communication research for non-academic journals,
describing cases without any analytic framework. Subsequently, academics took up crisis
communication research for publication in academic journals, and “introduced specific
theoretical frameworks or principles for analyzing cases” (Coombs, 2012, p. 23).
However, crisis communication research has remained predominantly concerned with
developing best practices for crisis managers on how to protect and defend the
organization’s image/reputation.
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Formulation of tactical (e.g., how organizational spokespeople people should
interact with the media) and strategic (e.g., how organizational spokespeople should align
their messages with organizational objectives) advices, in other words, remain the
mainstays of crisis communication research. In making a distinction between informal
and formal crisis communication research, Coombs (2012) argued that the former
employs such rhetorical theories as corporate apologia, image restoration, and renewal
discourse “to dissect and to interpret cases and to generate insights into crisis
communication” (p. 30) while the latter theories like situational crisis communication to
explain and predict how particular crises necessitate particular communicative responses.
However, I argue, the distinction is more often stylistic than substantive since both
formal and informal research in crisis communication ultimately have the common
objective of developing tactical and strategic advices for crisis communicators.
For example, as per Coombs’s distinction, Littlefield and Quenette’s (2007) study
is informal since it drew on Kenneth Burke’s perspectives on “the nature, functions, and
consequences of language as symbolic action” to explain how the media framed the crisis
response from the federal, state, and local governments and agencies in the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina (p. 28). On the contrary, Liska, Petrun, Sellnow, and Seeger’s (2012)
study, which employs chaos theory to explain predictive and explanatory ineffectiveness
of the local authorities’ crisis communication efforts, belongs to the formal research
category. Yet, in terms of objective, both essentially sought to offer insights into how
organizational spokespersons should not communicate (i.e., tactical) and formulate
message (i.e., strategic) at times of crises. I would also argue that Coombs’s (2012)
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classification of informal crisis communication on the basis of corporate apologia, image
restoration, and discourse renewal is rather tenuous since these frameworks should be
viewed as parts of a continuum. In fact, image restoration and renewal rhetoric both draw
on corporate apologia’s denial, bolstering, differentiation, and transcendence strategies.
Overall, crisis communication research remains, largely, unidirectional in its
objective (i.e., formulation of tactical and strategic advices for organizational managers)
and unidimensional in its orientation (i.e. assessment and evaluation of communication in
terms of effectiveness). These objectives and orientations ultimately account for its
inherent biases and weaknesses that have rendered crisis communication research
deficient by ignoring areas of investigation that should be a part of its purview. In the
ensuing section, I discuss the managerial and Western/U.S. biases, and exclusively
positivist/functionalist disposition of dominant crisis communication research, and how
these factors limits its scope and coverage, especially in terms of crises in non-Western
settings. The discussion also sets the stage for articulation of the rationale and purpose of
my study, and introduction of the case I have analyzed.
Weaknesses in Crisis Communication Research and Scholarship
Much of crisis communication research has followed a somewhat predictable
pattern, from describing the crisis event to explaining its cause to evaluating the
effectiveness of an organization’s communication through its different stages (e.g., Cole
& Fellows, 2008; Hearit & Courtright, 2003). Researchers have generally investigated
crisis events and consequent responses, communicative and otherwise, with the same set
of variables, not recognizing factors (e.g., culture and race) that play crucial roles in
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instigating crisis and influencing crisis response. Such inflexibility of research orientation
boils down to researchers’ commitment to a managerial perspective, inclination to
positivist theorizing, and bias to the West/U.S.
Managerial Bias
Dominant crisis communication scholarship in the U.S. views crisis from an
organizational perspective (i.e., as a disruption in normal operations, and a threat to
image/reputation) even when an organization may be responsible for the crisis (e.g.,
Liska et al., 2012). Consequently, crisis management and response is driven by a logic of
organizational damage control in terms of image and economics. However, as Heath
(2012) noted, it is often the case that ordinary people suffer infinitely more than
organization’s owners and managers. The Bhopal tragedy is a case in point. Although
more than 3,000 people were killed and thousands more were affected in the aftermath of
the deadly gas leak from the Union Carbide plant, crisis communication researchers were
more interested in “the role of rhetorical strategies in repairing damaged corporate
relationships” (Waymer & Heath 2007, p. 94). Kim and Dutta (2009) attributed such
marginalization of victims in mainstream crisis communication literature to “the
managerial commitments of crisis communication researchers” (p. 143). The managerial
bias, as discussed previously, is an inheritance from the broader discipline of public
relations.
Such a bias is apparent in the suggestions that researchers offer for effective crisis
communication. Although Coombs (2012) asserted that recent research, especially on
renewal discourse, emphasizes how the audiences “react to crisis events and crisis
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response strategies,” instead of examining “the messages the crisis managers create” and
inferring their “effects on the audience” (p. 35), it is anything but a shift from
organizational to public perspective. The study by Smith, Coffelt, Rives, and Sollitto
(2012) is instructive in this regard. They interviewed 29 victims of the 2009 ice storm in
Kentucky and found out that they “remembered their overall experience through positive
terms and positive interpersonal communication” (p. 53). The finding led the researchers
to conclude that “message designers for organizations, media outlets, and governmental
agencies should be mindful of the unique attributes of the victims they serve and
determine if positive communication can occur post-crisis” (p. 53). Simply put, the
audience perspective and perception is important insofar as it helps the organization
improve its crisis communication efficacy, meaning that the organizational perspective
ultimately holds the upper hand.
Positivist Theorizing
The prevalent managerial bias or commitment informs the theoretical orientation
of crisis communication research, which is overwhelmingly positivist in paradigm
whereby communication is “conceived as simple expression,” and “evaluated in terms of
its effectiveness” (Mumby, 1997, p. 4), and rhetorical in tradition whereby
communication problems are viewed as “social exigencies that can be resolved through
the artful use of discourse” (Craig, 1999, p. 135). Notably, as Curtin and Gaither (2005)
and Karlberg (1996) pointed out, the emphasis is on formulation of persuasive messages
towards effective diffusion of crisis. Simply put, dominant crisis communication
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scholarship invests in a linear transmission-based model where the information flow is
unidirectional, from the organization to the public.
The most commonly cited and/or employed theories in dominant crisis
communication research (e.g., corporate apologia, image repair/restoration, renewal
discourse, situational crisis communication theory, attribution theory) are grounded in
empiricist epistemology (i.e., reality can be knowable through systematic observation),
non-actional ontology (i.e., meaning is predetermined), and value-neutral axiology (i.e.,
scholarship is value free) (Littlejohn, 2002). In other words, crisis communication
research is largely invested in the understanding that meaning lies in the text and is
independent of context, and, most importantly, that meaning is preordained and the
receiver (the public) essentially deciphers the message as intended by the sender (the
organization). Thus, most literature conceptualizes the efficacy of a crisis message rests
in how the organization formulates it.
Such an understanding discounts any role an individual’s interpretation may have
in the process of communication, let alone their culture, ethnicity, sex, gender, age, and
so on. Troublingly, dominant crisis communication treats individuals as being above and
beyond their identity — cultural, ethnic and otherwise. Furthermore, there is an
underlying assumption that people across geographic and cultural borders react and
respond to crisis and crisis messages as Westerners/Americans do. As Lee (2005) noted,
not only is there a scarcity of crisis communication studies in non-Western cultures, the
very “conception of crisis communication is dominated by and unchallenged in a
Western-oriented paradigm” (p. 276). What this West/U.S.-centricity does, as I argue
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later, is that it renders the dominant theoretical framework inadequate and/or ineffective
to analyze and assess crisis communication in a non-Western setting.
Western/U.S. Bias
Explanations on why much of crisis communication research in the U.S. focuses
on crisis and crisis response in the Western/U.S. setting range from the benign to the
baneful. The most charitable explanation could be that theorizing in public relations and,
by extension, crisis communication has mostly “taken place in the United States… and
[is]… based on empirical evidence gathered by analyzing U.S. organizations”
(Sriramesh, 1996, p. 171). However, as Lee (2005) argued, it could very well be
reflective of “underlying ethnocentrism among researchers and practitioners” (p. 287). It
could also be an “‘America knows best’ cultural worldview” (Wakefield, 1996, p. 25)
that frames Western scholars’ explanations and evaluations of crisis communication
regardless of contexts or geographic and cultural borders.
Such ethnocentrism may, in fact, be typical of cross-cultural communication
studies in general. Yum (1988) complained of a tendency in cross-cultural
communication studies to “simply describe the foreign communication patterns and then
compare them to those of North America” without quite going “beyond the surface to
explore the roots of such differences” (p. 374). In their theorizing of crisis and crisis
communication in settings outside the West/U.S., crisis communication scholars have
displayed a similar tendency. Heath and O’Hair (2009) observed that understanding crisis
communication requires examination of “the nature of people and the society they build”
and “insight into society as a foundation” (p. 5). Yet, when it comes to crisis in non-
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Western settings, theorizing has been done with theoretical frameworks developed in and
for Western/U.S. context. In the next section, a few such cases are discussed.
Crisis in non-Western Settings
A number of crisis communication studies in non-Western contexts exemplify the
way that Western theorization constrains scholarship in the crisis communication field.
For example, Liu, McIntyre, and Sellnow (2008) employed narrative theory to analyze
the Chinese government’s crisis communication exercise in the wake of the SARS
outbreak. They demonstrated how it successfully used the state-owned newspaper to
advance a heroism narrative, highlighting the efforts of healthcare workers to contain the
outbreak and ensure proper care of the afflicted, thus restoring public faith in its ability to
manage the epidemic. Heath, Li, Bowen, and Lee (2008) also analyzed and assessed the
official crisis communication during the SARS outbreak in China. Their focus, however,
was on how the initial narrative that the Chinese government espoused proved
dysfunctional in a culture of secrecy and noncooperation that pervades Chinese society.
Overall, albeit conducted in non-Western settings, these studies, too, focused exclusively
on the organizational perspective of crisis and positivist/functionalist understanding of
communication that characterize dominant Western notions of crisis communication.
The social dimension of crisis is largely absent from such studies, be it in Western
or non-Western contexts. Of course, exceptions are there. For example, Thombre (2008)
highlighted the domination of denial, dismissal, dread, and discrimination in the
dominant discourses over HIV/AIDS pandemic in India, arguing how such discourses
could precipitate an unthinkable crisis in one of the most populous countries in the world.
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He also advanced a coherence discourse aimed at “creating a model of comprehensive
dialogue-based prevention programs that are backed by holistic care, treatment, and
support services” and “broader involvement of families and communities, keeping in
mind different contexts, cultures, and resources” (p. 194). This focus on contexts,
cultures, and resources becomes rather unavoidable when crisis is defined for not just its
organizational dimensions but also its social ramifications (Heath & O’Hair, 2009),
something that dominant U.S.-driven crisis communication scholarship has largely not
done so far.
Such a (re)definition of crisis is not possible within an organization/managercentric, positivism/functionalism-driven, and Western/U.S.-biased crisis communication
research. Several scholars (e.g., Kim & Dutta, 2009; McHale, Zompetti & Moffitt, 2007;
Waymer & Heath, 2007) challenged the largely uncontested logic of crisis
communication and its ideological assumptions, advancing analytical frameworks
grounded in theories belonging to critical (e.g., hegemonic theory) and postmodernist
(e.g., subaltern theory) paradigm. However, these scholars and their studies constitute a
minority in contemporary crisis communication scholarship. My thesis project, described
in the ensuing section, continues with the conversation these scholars have initiated.
The Purpose of the Thesis Project
This thesis project looks at a crisis in a non-Western setting, namely the Rana
Plaza collapse and its aftermath in Bangladesh, from a theoretical perspective rarely used
in contemporary crisis communication research and scholarship, namely postcolonial
theory. As indicated in the preceding section, one of the purposes of my thesis project is
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to challenge the dominant logic of contemporary U.S.-based crisis communication
research and scholarship by foregrounding the social dimension of crisis. Such a
disruption can complicate the understanding of crisis and crisis communication in several
ways. For example, crisis could be understood in terms of social discourse (Davis &
French, 2008) or in terms of competing social realities constructed by different
stakeholders (McHale et al., 2007). In such understanding of crisis, context, and not
merely text, becomes crucial in crisis communication.
To understand the crisis communication surrounding the Rana Plaza incident, the
thesis project analyzes the news coverage of the industrial disaster by the local and
international print media. The reason to select media text for analysis is twofold: first, the
media are regarded as a crucial conduit for crisis communication; and two, there are
many instances whereby the media informed and influenced social discourse on
individual and collective identities (e.g., Mădroane, 2012; Sing, 2011).
Crisis communication scholars are unanimous in their recognition of the centrality
of the media’s role in the information dissemination and knowledge management
objectives of crisis communication (Coombs, 2010; Veil & Ojeda, 2010). Sellnow and
Seeger (2013) emphasized the media’s “central role in crisis communication” for their
capacity for rapid dissemination of “information to mass audiences during crises”
(pp. 138–139). Fearn-Banks (2009), in fact, designated the media as the conduit for
organizational crisis communication and ranked organizational relations with the media
as one of the ten best practices related to crisis communication. Meanwhile, Holladay
(2009) suggested that organizations should actively participate in the “crisis framing
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process” to have “a positive influence” on how the media report a crisis (p. 216). This
suggestion is understandable in view of the media’s propensity to transition from being
“a vehicle providing the public with information to clarify the chaos surrounding the start
of the crisis” to “assuming a privileged position of pointing blame toward legitimate
authorities” (Littlefield & Quenette, 2007, pp. 27-28). This suggestion also reflects a
recognition of the media’s capacity to create a crisis of public perception for an
organization even when the organization’s action does not warrant it. For example,
Sellnow and Sellnow (2014), and Spence, Lachlan, Lin, Sellnow-Richmond, and Sellnow
(2015) studied how the media may negatively frame an organization’s standard operating
procedure through exemplars, created through frequent use of shocking visuals and
catchphrases. Overall, the suggestion for organizations to actively work with the media
underscores the knowledge management function of crisis communication.
Critical communication scholars often point to the existence of multiple
contrasting and contesting discourses surrounding a crisis event (e.g., Hearit &
Courtright, 2003; McHale et al., 2007). The news media play a dual role in crisis
discourse: convey and contribute. Most importantly, they shape the crisis discourse, using
“nuanced language and labels… to both facilitate and to limit knowledge about social
phenomena” while maintaining “[the] pretense of neutrality” (Davis & French, 2008,
pp. 245-246). These nuanced language and labels structure public perceptions about crisis
events, discursively constructing, in other words, the phenomena on the one hand and the
identities of those involved. Such discursive constructions of phenomena (e.g., “tragedy”
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or “disaster”) and identities (e.g., “victims” or “survivors”) are seldom neutral or natural
but almost always political (van Dijk, 2001).
In view of such realities relating to the media’s role in social discourse
surrounding crisis events, the purpose of the thesis is ultimately twofold: to identify
differences in discursive (re)construction by the local and global news media of the Rana
Plaza tragedy and the identities of the people who experienced it; and to explore how
these differences are informed by postcolonial awareness or neocolonial/imperial
impulses.
The Rana Plaza as a Crisis
The collapse of Rana Plaza at Savar in Bangladesh was the worst industrial
accident in South Asia since the leak of deadly gas from the Union Carbide plant in
Bhopal, India, left at least 3,800 people dead (“Disaster in Bangladesh,” 2013). It was
inarguably the worst industrial disaster in the readymade garment industry in Bangladesh
and, for that matter, anywhere in the world. However, it was not the first time that a
factory building had collapsed in Bangladesh:

Building collapses are unsettlingly common, especially in the overcrowded capital
where construction laws are frequently ignored. An estimated 500 people have
been killed in similar disasters over the past decade, including 73 garment
workers in a similar factory collapse in Savar in April 2005. (Campbell, 2013)

Also unsettlingly common are fire incidents in readymade garment factories. Exactly six
months before the collapse of Rana Plaza, a devastating fire at an apparel factory at
Ashulia, on the outskirts of the capital Dhaka, left 112 workers killed. A subsequent
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government inquiry found “a host of violations at Tazreen Fashions” (Manik & Yardley,
2012):

Managers on some floors closed collapsible gates to block workers from running
down the staircases, the ground-floor warehouse was illegal and the building’s
escape plan improper, and the factory lacked a required closed-circuit television
monitoring system. None of the fire extinguishers in the factory appeared to have
been used on the night of the fire, suggesting poor preparedness and training.

The inquiry recommended that the owner of the factory should be pressed with criminal
charges for “unpardonable negligence.” Yet, it took international pressure, sustained
protests in Bangladesh, and more than a year to have the owner of the factory behind
bars. It was not until January 2016 that his trial began in the court of law.
In case of the Rana Plaza tragedy, a high-level government inquiry, which
reported its findings within a month of the incident, indicated that the building’s collapse
was a long time in the making (Yardley, 2013). First and foremost, substandard materials
were used during the construction of the building while building codes were blatantly
disregarded. In fact, the government inquiry accused the mayor of the local municipality
of unlawfully granting approval for the construction of the building, named Rana Plaza
after its owner Sohel Rana. Moreover, it was built on a piece of land developed through
earth-filling of a pond. Besides, while the approvals were for five stories, Mr. Rana
constructed three additional levels; these floors were rented out to readymade garment
factories that employed several thousand workers. Large power generators were also
placed on these floors, which were necessary because of frequent power outages, a
regular feature in Bangladesh. The poorly constructed building would shake ominously
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whenever the generators were switched on. Apparently, the owner of Rana Plaza and the
factory bosses chose to ignore the risk that they were putting the apparel workers as well
as other tenants of the building.
Then, again, on the day before the collapse, cracks developed in the building,
making so much noise and shaking the structure so much that many workers fled the
building and refused to come back. An engineer was called in, to inspect the cracks; he
concluded that the building was unsafe. The engineer appeared on a private television
channel saying that he had told Mr. Rana, after his inspection that the building should be
evacuated because it was not safe (“Bangladesh Official: Disaster Not,” 2013). He also
claimed that he had asked government engineers that the building needed to be examined
further.
Meanwhile, the police had ordered that the building be evacuated and, within
hours after cracks had developed in the building, the branch of a private commercial bank
and several other shops housed in the lower floors evacuated. The next morning,
however, Mr. Rana, a local leader of the ruling Awami League’s youth wing, dismissed
the engineer’s warning and widespread concern about the building’s safety as “nothing
serious” (Campbell, 2013). He and owners of the clothing factories ordered the workers
into the building on the morning of the fateful day. Soon after they went in, there was a
power outage and the heavy generators were switched on, shaking the weakened
structure. In about 15 minutes, the building came crashing down on the hapless hundreds.
The rescue operation was itself at the receiving end of widespread complaints and
controversies:
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The rescue operation was a fiasco, with the area not even cordoned off. Tens of
thousands of bystanders besieged the site, some entering the wreckage. Soldiers
and firemen were present, but it was mostly left to locals to drag out survivors and
corpses. At one point bystanders pelted volunteers with stones for making such
slow progress, prompting police to use tear gas. Every day the stench of rotting
bodies grew. (“Disaster in Bangladesh,” 2013)

When the rescue efforts were officially called off, about three weeks after the building
collapsed, the death toll had topped 1,100 and many workers still remained unaccounted
for.
Just as in the case of the Tazreen Fashions factory fire, the Rana Plaza cases have
gone through delays and deferments. Mr. Rana, the owner of Rana Plaza who had gone
into hiding immediately after the collapse, was arrested near the Bangladesh-India border
on April 28, 2013. It took the police more than two years to press charges of culpable
homicide and negligence against him and 41 others in three criminal cases on June 1,
2015. Worse still, the trial began only in June 2016. While Mr. Rana, the prime accused,
and five others are in jail, 23 are out on bail and 13 others remain fugitive (Islam, 2016).
Given the notorious backlog of cases in Bangladesh’s judicial system, justice could be
delayed indefinitely, if not denied altogether. Thus, it comes as little surprise that one of
the survivors of the Rana Plaza tragedy, who lost her husband in the building collapse,
wondered “the culprits will be punished” (Manik & Najar, 2015).
Proposed Chapter Outline of Thesis
The thesis has four more chapters. In Chapter 2, I review the literature on
postcolonial theory, and crisis, media and news framing, leading to the two research
questions that will guide my thesis. In Chapter 3, I explain and justify my use of critical
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discourse analysis as my research methodology, and also my source of data. In Chapter 4,
I present the data analysis. In Chapter 5, I first discuss the implications of my research, in
view of the limitations that I have identified in the dominant crisis communication
research and scholarship in the U.S. Then, I discuss the heuristic directions that the thesis
project offers.
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The dominant crisis communication scholarship in the U.S. is driven by an
organizational/managerial commitment, characterized by a positivist/functionalist
understanding of communication, and grounded in a Western/U.S. bias. These multiple
biases make crisis communication research somewhat limited in scope and coverage,
especially where a crisis in non-Western settings is analyzed. To break away from such
rigidity and predictability, I argue, a foregrounding of the social dimension of crisis is
needed. This, as I have discussed and sought to demonstrate in the previous chapter,
complicates our understanding of crisis communication in several ways. I am especially
interested in understanding how local and global media outlets contributed to the
discursive (re)construction of the crisis in the aftermath of the Rana Plaza incident in
Bangladesh.
Bangladesh is a country with a strong postcolonial legacy. The nation had been
ruled by the British colonizers as part of the Indian subcontinent and then by the West
Pakistan-based political and military elite before it secured its political freedom in 1971
after about nine months of bloody armed struggle. At the same time, Bangladesh has been
swept by the globalization of capitalist economy and transnational media, with the two
working hand in hand “to ideologically condition a moral order, to transform the way
people conceptualize their lives, shape common sense, or even to limit the boundaries of
imagination” (Artz, 2003, p. 56). In other words, social discourse in Bangladesh is in the
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midst of contrary pulls of colonial legacy, postcolonial awareness, and
neocolonial/imperial impulse.
Again, as Davis and French (2008) argued, the media do more than disseminate
information during a crisis; they shape social discourse about the crisis and discursively
(re)produce identities of those affected by it. News-framing is often the process that
media organizations employ in such discursive (re)construction of a crisis and also the
identities of the individuals and institutions it affects. I am, thus, interested in examining,
through a postcolonial theoretical lens, how the media, both local and global, frame the
Rana Plaza tragedy and discursively (re)construct the crisis and the identities of
individuals affected by the crisis. As such, in this section, I proceed with a review of the
literature, first on postcolonial theory, and then on crisis and news framing. The review
culminates in the research questions for the thesis project.
Postcolonial Theory
Postcolonial theory is often defined in terms of what it does, rather than what it is.
For example, Burney (2012) noted that it has been used as a “critical tool” to deconstruct
the underlying layers, structures, and forms that are embedded in the colonial past and the
postcolonial present” and as a “theoretical lens” to critique “[w]ide-ranging issue relating
to nationalism, history, socio-economics, geopolitics, and international relations” (p. 42).
Nayar (2010), on the other hand, defined postcolonial theory as “a method of interpreting,
reading and critiquing the cultural practices of colonialism, where it proposes that the
exercise of colonial power is also the exercise of racially determined powers of
representation” (p. 25). Others have defined postcolonialism as a wide array of critical
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practices that seeks to “dismantle the West as the normative center of the world, to move
beyond West-centered historicism, beyond imperial binary structures of Self/Other and
center/periphery, and ultimately beyond any form of imperialism” (Rao, 2011, p. 792). In
other words, postcolonial theory has been conceptualized as a critical tool, a method of
reading and interpretation, a conglomeration of critical practices, so on and so forth.
Its origin is also contested. Orientalism (1978) is often dubbed the precursor to
postcolonial studies, and its author, Edward Said, as its father, “a paternity he strenuously
denied but a designation he could not escape” (Parry, 2013, p. 107). Then, of course,
there is the school of thought that traced postcolonial discourse in the work of Franz
Fanon, for example. What is, however, beyond doubt is that the works of Said and Fanon
were instrumental in the emergence of colonial discourse analysis, which also explains
“modern colonialism and imperialism as integral to capitalism’s beginnings, expansion,
and ultimate global entrenchment” (p. 107). Said, in particular, introduced a new way to
make meaning of texts, literary and otherwise, and interrogated the hitherto taken-forgranted assumption that canonical Western literature, especially as it pertained to how the
Orient was conceptualized or, to use his own word, imagined, was above and beyond the
worldliness of politics.
Said’s (1978) interrogation of Orientalism, the study of the Orient in postEnlightenment Europe, was predicated on two core arguments. First, the “ontological and
epistemological distinction” (p. 2) between the Occident and the Orient was as imagined
as the geographical boundaries between the West and the East; and second, production of
such distinctions and, for that matter, the Orientalist discourse in general was inherently
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part of a greater political project. The central thesis of Said’s text was that Orientalism
was essentially designed to argue for, and thus legitimize, intervention—political,
cultural, and even military—by the European powers. His argument, at the time, was seen
as blasphemous due to the way it decentered the commonsense view of Western
normalcy, if not superiority. Most importantly, it changed the terrains and trajectories of
literary and cultural studies forever.
The enduring legacy of Said’s Orientalism (1978) is the postulation that
knowledge generation is not an apolitical exercise, just as the Orientalist study in the
post-Enlightenment Europe was not. He drew on Foucauldian discourse and Gramscian
hegemony to explain how the study of the Orient proved to be effective and enduring
because it was “a distribution of geopolitical awareness into aesthetic, scholarly,
economic, sociological, historical, and philological texts…” (p. 12, emphasis in original).
Said also asserted that Orientalism was an “enormously systematic discipline by which
European culture was able to manage—and even produce—the Orient politically,
sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the postEnlightenment period” (p. 3). Such production and management was based on how
identities of the West and the East were discursively constructed as us and them, self and
other. It is important to note that such dichotomies were undergirded by a value
assignment. In this imagination, as Said argued, the East was inferior and needed to be
salvaged by the superior West.
Said’s interrogation of discursive construction of individual and collective
identities (e.g., Oriental and Orient), as indicated, has come to be the critical tool for
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postcolonial studies. What he employed as a tool to dissect colonial discourse of
subjugation is now used to understand the postcolonial discourse of resistance and
counter-hegemony. There is, however, the tendency to unduly emphasize the spatiality
and temporality of postcolonial theory (e.g., Kavoori, 1998). Shome and Hegde (2002)
argued that the postcolonial scholarship is “committed to theorizing the problematics and
contexts of de/colonization” but not exclusively focused on “chronicling the facts of
colonialism” (p. 250). They added that its commitment and critical goals are
“interventionist and highly political” and thus not limited to theorizing “just colonial
conditions but why those conditions are what they are, and how they can be undone and
redone” (p. 250). What such commitment and critical goals enable postcolonial studies to
do is to widen its scope and coverage to critique disparity of power relations that produce
and perpetuate the dominant-dominated dichotomy.
In contemporary times, though, the East-West and North-South divides are not as
clear as it used to be, for example, during the height of the British colonial enterprise.
The distinctions have become increasingly “porous under the conditions of globalization”
(Shome & Hegde, 2002, p. 257). Globalization, as Shome and Hegde reminded us,
“inevitably heralds a connected world of utopian possibilities—the ultimate dream of
corporate slogans” but conceals “the realities of deep divisions and inequities of
exchange” (p. 261). To Rao (2011), understanding globalization requires the
understanding of “the structure of global power relations which flourishes in the twentyfirst century as an economic, cultural, and political legacy of Western imperialism”
(pp. 782-783). Murphy (2003) also argued that colonialism has evolved from the physical
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to the political and mental, and that the globalization of capitalism is “intimately
connected with colonialism and imperialism” (p. 58). Grossberg (2002) made a similar
argument that “the contemporary organizations of nations, states, ethnicities, and races
are the product of a colonial history and its continuing rearticulation in contemporary
local and international, economic and cultural, relations” (p. 369). Postcolonial theory,
thus, provides the theoretical and methodological tools to critique globalization.
However, while postcolonial theory provided different disciplines with the
conceptual framework and the methodological tool to critique a wide array of issues, its
influence on and application in communication studies remain somewhat limited. Kumar
(2014) argued that postcolonial studies and communication studies exist in “a rather
ambivalent relationship” although both are “centrally concerned with the study of
language, communication, and culture in specific contexts” (p. 380). Shome and Hegde
(2002), too, wondered why postcolonial theory has remained largely ignored in
communication studies although “the politics of postcoloniality is centrally imbricated in
the politics of communication” (p. 249). Not surprisingly, thus, save a few rare
exceptions (e.g., Kim & Dutta, 2009; McHale et al., 2007; Waymer & Heath, 2007),
postcolonial theory has not been used to analyze the role of media discourse during
crises.
Surprisingly still, although postcolonial theory is invested in understanding
discursive (re)production of identity, its deployment in explication of how the media use
particular linguistic and semantic registers to inform and influence social discourses has
been rather rare. Most analysis of discursive (re)construction of social phenomena and
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(re)production of identities of people associated with those phenomena has been done
using critical discourse analysis as both theoretical framework and methodology.
For example, Sing (2011) conducted a critical discourse analysis of the Guardian
news coverage the old vs. new Europe debate, triggered by the “notoriously unforgettable
words—‘You’re thinking Europe as Germany and France. I don’t. I think that’s old
Europe—issued in 2003 by the then American Secretary of Defense” (p. 143, emphasis in
original). Similarly, Mădroane (2012) employed critical discourse analysis of a press
campaign by a large circulation Romanian broadsheet to explain how it influenced policy
deliberations on the one hand and “dynamic and strategic construal of collective
identities” in the Roma, Romanian, and European identity debate on the other (p.103).
Both these studies have shown how identities are discursively (re)created through
particular linguistic representations.
Relevant to crisis communication, Davis and French (2008) employed critical
discourse analysis, in tandem with social constructionism, to explicate, among other
things, how the media in their post-Hurricane Katrina coverage used “rhetorical devices,
semantic strategies, and normalized terminology (e.g., victim and survivor) that
constructed citizens in a particular way” (p. 248). For example, “recurring references to
both socioeconomic status and race” were made to “construct a particular identity as the
‘typical’ victim.” (p. 249). The study showed how the media used language and label to
project particular identities in respect of the natural disaster. The study also showed how
critical discourse analysis could be used with other theories for theoretical frameworks
for such analysis.
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The ensuing discussion on crisis, media and news framing shows that postcolonial
theory offers a potent theoretical tool to examine how media organizations selects and
produces news frames and thus inform and influence crisis discourse, and how their
political/ideological consciousness/conviction (e.g., neocolonial/imperial, postcolonial)
(re)shape the discourse and discursively (re)construct a crisis and (re)produce identities
of individuals that experience it.
Crisis, Media, and News Framing
Crisis communication scholars recognize that the media play a crucial role in
crisis communication — for two reasons in particular. First, the media can and do quickly
disseminate information to the mass audience during a crisis (Sellnow & Seeger, 2013).
Typically, people seek information before, during and after a crisis, to assess where they
are and what they should do (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003). For example, when
Hurricane Katrina ripped through the Gulf Coast of Louisiana and Mississippi in 2005,
there was a spike in public demand for information, with those in the area of impact
seeking to find out what evacuation plan the local authorities had in place and how they
could remain safe while those outside seeking to know the path that the storm would take
(Littlefield & Quenette, 2007).
Second, most people learn about crises from the media. Notably, however, as
Holladay (2012) argued, the media do not extensively cover every crisis although they
may be significant to the affected communities. Crisis communication scholars strive to
understand and explain why as a part of their view of the media’s agenda-setting role and
news framing effects (Sellnow & Seeger, 2013). While agenda-setting underscores
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positive correlations between the media’s emphasis on certain issues and the audience’s
attribution of importance to these issues, news framing presupposes that how the media
portray an issue influences its understanding by the audience (Scheufele & Tewksbury,
2007). Media scholars continue to argue, though, if the two are the two sides of the same
coin or if news framing should be subsumed under agenda setting (Tewksbury &
Scheufele, 2009). It is beyond doubt, however, that how the news media emphasize an
issue or portray an event significantly influences people’s perception of the issue and the
event (Entman, 1993). Thus, it is important to understand what factors play into news
framing.
Societal norms and values, organizational compulsions and constraints, pressures
from vested interests, professional routines, and journalists’ political and ideological
orientations are believed to play significant roles in news selection and production
(Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2010). Any of these or other factors may translate into
“systematic bias in media framing of issues, actors, and events” (Entman, 2010, p. 333).
Hence, it is only expected that different media organizations would characterize the same
crisis differently (e.g., Tian & Stewart, 2005). Meanwhile, unprecedented advancement
of information technology in recent years has resulted in a fast globalization of the media
landscape (Christians, 2005). Critical scholars (e.g., Artz, 2003; Murphy, 2003) argue
that such media globalization has coincided with the globalization of capitalist economy
and led to the rise of media monopoly that essentially dictates what is news and what is
not, and, for example, how news is framed. Needless to say, there often is a stark contrast
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in how the so-called global, and essentially Western, media frame a crisis compared to
the local media.
The very term framing suggests giving prominence to certain elements of reality.
In terms of news production, it means highlighting particular aspects of an event or an
issue that promote particular understanding of that event or issue. Entman (1993)
postulated four functions of frames (i.e., definition of problem, diagnosis of cause,
passage of moral judgement, and suggestion of remedies). These functions, he argued,
occur in several locations in the communication process, including the communicator, the
text, the receiver, and the culture. Appreciation and analysis of news frames, thus, require
a factoring in of the context wherein the communication is taking place. Context, in other
words, determines how the framing functions play out (e.g., how the problem is defined,
the cause is diagnosed).
De Vreese (2005) drew on Entman’s definition of framing, and posited framing as
an integrated communicative process that involves “frame-building, frame-setting, and
individual and societal level consequences of framing” (pp. 51-52). In news production,
the frame-building stage entails selection of frames and its translation into news items
while, in the frame-setting stage, interactions between the media frames and the
audience’s extant understanding and inclination take place. The final stage refers to the
impact that the media frames have on the individual as well as the society. Framebuilding may entail structural and/or rhetorical processes, with the media including
certain information and excluding others on the structural level, and/or taking recourse to
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stereotypes and other culturally-dependent constructs on the rhetorical level (Wiesman,
2011).
As indicated earlier, the selection of news frames is a site for conflicts and
contests, with societal norms and values, vested interests, professional routines weighing
in along with political and ideological orientations of journalists/media organizations
(Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2010). D’Angelo and Kuypers (2010) noted that, amidst
pressure from “politicians, issue advocates, and stakeholders use journalists and other
news professionals to communicate their preferred meanings of events and issues,”
journalists often add or superimpose their own frames in the news-making process (p. 1).
News framing is thus not immune to ideological and political influence and intervention.
The preceding discussion on news framing and associated institutional and
individual bias could raise the suspicion that the notion of objectivity in news selection
and production, especially in the mainstream media, local and global, is ultimately a
myth. The classical definition of good journalists as individuals serving their society
through collecting and disseminating information that the members of that society need to
be free and autonomous (e.g., Elliott & Ozar, 2010; Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2001) may be
misleading at best and deceptive at worst. As Hartley and Montgomery (1985/2016)
noted, news is “active in the politics of sense making, even when the stories concern
matters not usually understood as political…, and even when it is striving for
impartiality” (p. 260). After all, in the current world order, freedom and autonomy for
some often entail subjugation for other, and the mainstream media, global and local, often
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feed, wittingly or unwittingly, the creation and perpetuation of the divide between the
empowered and the disempowered.
Research Questions
The preceding discussion leads to two broader conclusions. First, the managerial,
post-positivist, and pro-West/U.S. logic and its underlying political/ideological
assumptions render the dominant crisis communication research and scholarship
deficient, and thus themselves need to be questioned and contested. Second, such
questioning and contestation ultimately extends the scope and coverage for crisis
communication scholarship into examining issues that have so far been largely ignored
(e.g., how the media organizations contribute to crisis discourse and associated discursive
(re)construction of crisis and identities of institutions and individuals that experience it).
These conclusions, in turn, inform the two research questions that guide the present
study:
RQ1: What insights about crisis communication emerge in shifting from a
traditional, functionalist to a postcolonial theoretical framework for analysis?
RQ2: How do Western and Bangladeshi newspapers support and/or resist a
colonial legacy in their framing of the Rana Plaza crisis?
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
Certain broader epistemological assumptions undergird my thesis project. First,
the media—both local and global—informed and influenced the crisis discourse
surrounding the Rana Plaza tragedy and, in so doing, discursively (re)constructed the
crisis and (re)produced the identities (e.g., “victims” and “survivors”) of institutions and
individuals who experienced it. Second, the media organizations brought their own
politico-ideological biases and assumptions into such discursive (re)construction of event
and (re)production of identities. Finally, they employed news framing as a tool for their
discursive (re)construction of the crisis and (re)production of relevant identities. Based on
these epistemological assumptions, I set out to analyze the coverage of the Rana Plaza
tragedy by Western and Bangladeshi English-language newspapers. In the ensuing
sections, I first describe the sources that I collected my data from and the procedure that I
followed to collect the data. I also put forth explanations as to why I have chosen these
sources and not others. I finish the section with a discussion on Critical Discourse
Analysis, which I will use as the analytical framework for data analysis.
Data Source
The Lexis-Nexis Academic database was accessed for reports in the Western and
Bangladeshi newspapers on the Rana Plaza tragedy. “Rana Plaza,” “Rana Plaza tragedy,”
and “Rana Plaza disaster” were used as search parameters for reports, features, and
editorial comments published between April 24, 2013 when the disaster occurred and
April 24, 2016. The search returned more than 900 entries. Texts from two newspapers
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each from the United States (i.e., the New York Times and the Washington Post), the
United Kingdom (i.e., the Guardian and the Telegraph), and Bangladesh (i.e., the
Financial Express and the New Nation) were selected. The reason for the selection of
U.S. and British newspapers for the analysis was twofold. First, several retail chains
operating out of the U.K. and the U.S. (e.g., Children’s Place, Walmart, Cato Fashions,
Mango) were at the receiving end of the public outrage, both national and international,
over the Rana Plaza disaster; these companies had outsourced their readymade garment
products from the factories housed in the ill-fated building. Second, Bangladesh was
under the British rule for nearly two hundred years from 1757 to 1947, and is very much
within the arc of the present-day U.S.-led capitalist hegemony.
The New York Times and the Washington Post were selected from among several
U.S. newspapers because of their position in the American media industry and place in
the American media history. The two newspapers are among the oldest, most circulated
and acclaimed, and most influential news publications in the U.S. The New York Times
has been in circulation since 1851, sells nearly 1.5 million copies a day, and is the winner
of 117 Pulitzer Prizes. The Washington Post, on the other hand, has been in circulation
since 1877, sells nearly half a million copies every day, and is the winner of 47 Pulitzer
Prizes. Similarly, from among newspapers published in the United Kingdom, the
Guardian and the Telegraph were selected for analysis because they are among the most
acclaimed, having won the Newspaper of the Year award several times since the award
was introduced in 1962, and the most influential. The Guardian, which began publication
on May 5, 1821 and was known as the Manchester Guardian until 1959, predates the
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Telegraph, which started circulation on June 1, 1855, by more than three decades. In
terms of daily circulation, though, the Telegraph is substantially ahead, selling, as of
December 2016, 460,054 copies compared to the Guardian’s 161,091. However, the
online edition of the Guardian was the fifth most widely read in the world in 2014, with
over 42.6 million viewers 1.
The New Nation is one of the oldest English-language newspapers in Bangladesh;
it began as a daily paper in 1981 after three years of publication as a weekly. It is also the
first independent English-language daily in the country; the two other English-language
dailies in circulation at that time were both state-run. In comparison, the Financial
Express is new; it began publication in 1993. However, it is the first financial Englishlanguage daily in Bangladesh with syndication arrangements with the London-based
Financial Times and the Prague-based Project Syndicate. It is important to note here that
English-language newspapers have a very limited readership in Bangladesh. The highestcirculated English-language daily sells less than a tenth of the number of copies that its
Bangla-language counterpart sells every day. According to the 2014 government figures,
the English-language Daily Star 2 sold 41,150 copies every day, compared to 553,150 by
the Bangla-language Bangladesh Protidin (“Bangladesh Protidin Tops Circulation,”
2014). However, the English-language newspapers have “made a niche among the elite,
middle class, and decision-makers” and are thus “considerably influential in spite of their
smaller circulation figures” (Genilo, Asiuzzaman, & Osmani, 2016, p. 130). This

1

Information on the selected British and U.S. newspapers has been sourced from Wikipedia.
The Daily Star was not included in the analysis because there was no report by the newspaper
on the Lexis-Nexis Academic Database.
2
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influence factor informed and influenced my decision to choose Bangladeshi Englishlanguage dailies, and not Bangla-language dailies, for the analysis.
The Lexis-Nexis Academic Database had more entries for Rana Plaza against the
two Bangladeshi newspapers (i.e., 179 for the Financial Express and 131 for the New
Nation) than the four international newspapers selected for the study (i.e., 31 for the New
York Times, 8 for the Washington Post, 68 for the Guardian, and 16 for the Telegraph).
Moreover, these entries included duplications and news advisories (i.e., lists of news
reports and features). Besides, some of these reports and features only made a passing
reference to Rana Plaza. For example, the New York Times piece dated August 27, 2015
on a Bangladesh court’s embargo on the release of a documentary film on the industrial
disaster was not included in the analysis as it focuses exclusively on the court’s ruling
and its implications. Similarly, the Financial Express report dated April 23, 2015 on the
Human Rights Watch recommendations for improvement in working condition across
Bangladesh’s readymade garment industry was excluded because it deals primarily with
the 78-page document released by the New York-based human rights watchdog.
Furthermore, some more reports and features were excluded from the analysis because
they primarily dealt with the daily updates on the rescue operations, and casualty figures.
For example, the New Nation report dated April 25, 2013 was not selected because it
essentially tallies the number of bodies recovered and of people rescued from the rubbles
on the day that the building collapsed. These reports were thought to be of limited
relevance insofar as the purpose of the thesis is concerned (i.e., how local and
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international media discursively (re)constructed the Rana Plaza tragedy and the identities
of individuals and institutions that had experienced the crisis).
In the end, 20 items were selected from the New York Times, 6 from the
Washington Post, 23 from the Guardian, 4 from the Telegraph. These news reports,
features, and editorial comments reasonably represented the trajectory of news coverage
of the Rana Plaza disaster and its aftermath by the international media organizations. As
can be understood from these texts, these newspapers pivoted to the issue of financial
compensation for the dead and the wounded within a couple of months of the disaster.
This shift in focus, as I argue in the results section, contributed significantly to the
discursive (re)construction of the disaster itself and of the identities of the institutions and
individuals who experienced it.
The texts selected from the selected British and U.S. newspapers were used to
develop a timeline, which subsequently provided the matrix for selecting reports,
features, and editorial comments from the two Bangladeshi newspapers. To illustrate, one
of the New York Times reports is dated April 26, 2013 and, thus, the reports published in
the Financial Express and the New Nation on the same date were selected for analysis. In
cases where there were multiple reports in the Bangladeshi newspapers on a particular
date, those with similar focus or emphasis vis-à-vis the British and/or U.S. newspapers
were selected for analysis. For example, on April 26, 2013, the Financial Express
published two pieces on the Rana Plaza disaster and the New Nation four but only the
Financial Express items were analyzed because the focus/emphasis was similar to that
the New York Times report of the same date. Moreover, if the two Bangladeshi
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newspapers carried reports on the same incident/development, one of them was selected
for analysis. For example, both the Financial Express and the New Nation reported the
arrest of the Rana Plaza owner five days after the building collapsed but the Financial
Express report was selected for analysis because there was no significant difference in the
content and emphasis of the reports. In the end, 26 reports from the Financial Express and
23 from the New Nation were analyzed. Overall, thus, 102 reports, features and editorial
comments were analyzed for the study (see Appendix A and B).
Data Analysis
My thesis project examined how the local and global media organizations
discursively framed the crisis surrounding the Rana Plaza disaster and, in the process,
contributed to the (re)production of identities of individuals and institutions that
experienced the crisis. Such an examination essentially presupposes that the meaning of
any media text is assigned, not innate, and dynamic, not static, warranting an
understanding of not just the text and textual structure in news coverage but also its
socio-politico-cultural context (Meadows, 2014). As van Dijk (1988) noted, a news
analysis could only be socially, politically, and ideologically relevant insofar as it made
“explicit implied or indirect meanings of functions of news reports: What is not said may
even be more important, from a critical point of view, than what is explicitly said or
meant” (p. 17). The emphasis of the analysis was, thus, not on determining how many
times a term or a phrase appeared in a news item (i.e., quantitative content analysis) but
rather on how it was used to create meaning (i.e., qualitative discourse analysis).

42

Moreover, implicit in the central assumption of my thesis project is the
understanding that media organizations bring their own political and ideological biases
into their coverage of incidents and issues, and often give precedence to one particular
discourse over others. Given such a critical edge to the project, I have chosen to employ
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as the primary analytical tool. CDA aims to
“investigate critically social inequality as it is expressed, signaled, constituted,
legitimized and so on by language use (or in discourse)” (Wodak, 2001, p. 2), is premised
on the assumption that “all discourses are historical and can therefore only be understood
with reference to their context” (Meyer, 2001, p. 15), and theorizes “discourse as a
moment of social practices” (Fairclough, 2001, p. 122). The description of discourse as
social practice, according to Fairclough and Wodak (1997), “implies a dialectical
relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), the institution(s)
and social structure(s) which frame it” (p. 258); discourse is not just shaped by but also
shapes situations, institutions, and social structures. What it means, among others, is that
discourse “constitutes… social identities of and relationships between people and groups
of people” (p. 258). As such, CDA is frequently employed to examine and explicate how
identity, especially collective identity, are discursively formed and negotiated (e.g.,
Richardson & Langford, 2015). CDA also views the mass media “as a site of power and
social struggle, as well as a site where language is often only apparently transparent”
(Wodak & Busch, 2004, p. 110). Several studies have shown the mass media to be active
participant in discursive construction and negotiation of collective identities (e.g.,
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Mădroane 2012). Overall, the theoretical position, proposition, and preoccupation of
CDA is consistent with the critical and postcolonial traditions that frame my project.
In view of the ongoing debate as to whether CDA is a theory or a method or both,
questions may arise if it could or should be employed as a methodological tool to
complement a theoretical perspective. CDA has been used exclusively as a methodology
(Mădroane, 2012), as both a theoretical perspective and a methodological tool (e.g.,
Alexander, 2013; Cheregi, 2015; Richardson & Langford, 2015) as well as in
combination with other methodologies as an analytical tool (e.g., Sing, 2011). Thus,
when Van Dijk (2001) argued that CDA is “not a method, nor a theory that simply can be
applied to social problems” (p. 96), it could have been an affirmation of CDA’s
ontological fluidity as well as flexibility.
It is also important to note that there is not a single methodological model of CDA
to follow. Van Dijk (1993) noted that certain persuasive moves (i.e., argumentation,
rhetorical figures, lexical style, quoting credible witnesses) are used to enhance a
particular discourse and, at the same time, undermine others. The discourse analytical
study of the selected text for my thesis project was limited to examining and explicating
how these persuasive moves were used as discursive strategies. To this end, the selected
texts were closely read, which led to the identification of several common points of
emphases such as the cause of the disaster, the need for the readymade garment industry
to recover, and redress for those affected by the disaster. However, surrounding these
points of emphases, the local and global media organizations presented and persisted with
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different and sometimes contradictory discourses through employment of the persuasive
moves discussed above.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have described how the data for my thesis project was collected.
I have stated the rationale for the selection of the Guardian and the Telegraph from the
United Kingdom, New York Times and the Washington Post from the United States, and
the Financial Express and the New Nation from Bangladesh as sources of data. I have
also explained the process undertaken to put together the 102 items from these
newspapers, including reports, features, and editorial comments. Furthermore, I have
offered a rationale why I conducted a qualitative textual analysis, not quantitative content
analysis, for the study. Finally, I have reasoned why I chose CDA as the analytical tool,
explaining how its theoretical position, proposition, and preoccupation are consistent with
the critical and postcolonial bent of for my thesis project. In the next chapter, I present
the results of the data analysis.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
For this project, I conducted a qualitative textual analysis of 102 news reports,
features, and editorial comments on the Rana Plaza collapse from six English-language
news dailies—two each from the United Kingdom, the United States, and Bangladesh.
The analysis was aimed at identifying if and how the Bangladeshi newspapers differed
with their counterparts in the U.K. and the U.S. in the discursive creation and negotiation
of identities of individuals and institutions that experienced—directly and indirectly—the
crisis in the aftermath of the collapse of the multistoried building, which killed more than
1,100 people and wounded over 2,000 others. Several common points of emphasis related
to the Rana Plaza incident emerged upon a close reading of the texts from the six
newspapers. These included the cause[s] of the collapse, its impact[s] on the industry and
individuals, and the redress, financial and otherwise, for the dead and the wounded.
However, these common points of emphasis did not produce one overarching discourse
that one might expect. In fact, there appeared to be two discernible discourses
surrounding the Rana Plaza crisis, one advanced and maintained by the Western and the
other by the Bangladeshi newspapers. The identities thus created and negotiated were
different, too. The analysis also revealed that the difference in the two discourses was
directly linked to how the Western and Bangladeshi newspapers framed the collapse of
the Rana Plaza. In sum, the discursive creation of identities of individuals and institutions
that experienced the Rana Plaza crisis was consequent upon and/or occasioned by the
news framing of the Rana Plaza collapse.

46

This chapter is divided into five sections. The first section deals with how the
Western newspapers framed the collapse of the Rana Plaza, and how their framing was
different from that by the Bangladeshi newspapers. In the second section, I describe how
these newspapers framed the Bangladesh garment industry (in particular) and Bangladesh
(in general) and how such framing is consistent with their discourse on the Rana Plaza
collapse. In the third section, I discuss how the Western media approached the
compensation issue and how its approach differed from that of the local newspapers. The
fourth section traces how the Western media portrays the factory safety initiatives by
European and U.S. factories. The fifth and final section depicts the two sets of identities
that emerged from the discourses advanced by the Western and Bangladeshi newspapers,
and illustrates the connections between the discursive dynamics described and discussed
in the preceding sections.
Accident vs. Murder: Framing the Rana Plaza Collapse
Within a week of the collapse, it became clear that the number of fatalities would
be in several hundreds and could even exceed the 1,000-mark. As the death toll climbed,
there were numerous reports in the national and international media on what had caused
the collapse and how it could have been averted. The British and U.S. newspapers
generally framed the incident as somewhat inevitable. The New York Times wrote on
April 26, 2013:

What is increasingly clear is that the collapse should not have been a surprise.
Factory fires have killed hundreds of garment workers in the past decade. At the
same time, many factory buildings are substandard and unsafe.
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It was a reference to the frequent occurrence of industrial accidents and the grim record
of factory safety in Bangladesh, especially in the readymade garment industry. The
Guardian, on the other hand, blamed it on systemic dysfunctionality in its April 29, 2013
report:

Rana’s [owner of the building] dramatic capture raises a broader question:
whether Wednesday's disaster was all the fault of one man, or, as some suggest,
was the product of Bangladesh’s dysfunctional system, where politics and
business are closely connected, corruption is rife, and the gap between rich and
poor continues to grow.

The British daily traced the cause of the collapse back to the dysfunctionality of
Bangladesh’s socio-politico-economic system. The government inquiry report, which was
released on May 22, just about a month after the collapse of the Rana Plaza, drew similar
conclusions. The New York Times summarized the inquiry findings in one short
paragraph of its May 23, 2013 report:

Rana Plaza was a disaster waiting to happen, the government report suggested.
Mr. Rana illegally constructed upper floors to house garment factories employing
several thousand workers, it said. Large power generators placed on these upper
floors, necessary because of regular power failures, would shake the poorly
constructed building whenever they were switched on, according to the report.

The inquiry report clearly bolstered the British and U.S. newspapers’ perspective on the
Rana Plaza collapse that it was neither unprecedented nor isolated and might have been
inevitable.
The Bangladeshi newspapers were also aware of the systemic dysfunctionality
that had contributed to the Rana Plaza disaster. The New Nation reported on April 25,
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2013 that the owner had not secured approval from the capital city development
authorities, known as Rajuk after its Bangla acronym, for the building but gone ahead
with its construction, making most of the existence of two contradictory laws:

One such law said a person who want [sic] to construct a building at Savar before
2008 was not required to take Rajuk permission, since it is not located in the city
area. Another law said it is mandatory to take such permission. There is a total
chaos and dishonest people have taken advantage of it.

It was even more critical in a subsequent editorial comment, published on April 27, 2013:

The building cracked one day earlier, but no authority showed any concern about
protecting the lives of few thousand garment workers. The government has
become so unaccountable to the people that nobody in the government takes
people [sic] lives seriously. The truth is, the country is in the grip of greedy
incompetent persons who are busy serving self-interest. The success of the
government will be best judge [sic] how many of them have been able to amass
how much wealth.

The Financial Express was equally scathing in its April 26, 2013 editorial comment:

Tragedies starting from Tazreen Garments to Rana Plaza tell the same story. One
need not have to abide by the rules of the country; things are disposed off [sic] by
the ‘grace’ of almost ‘almighty’ money and political power. Look at Tazreen.
Was the owner arrested for violation of laws? Will the owners, both of the
building and factories, be arrested for the ‘murder’ they allegedly committed on
Wednesday? The answer is probably a big ‘No.’

Clearly, the Bangladeshi newspapers acknowledged the underlying systemic failures but,
unlike their Western counterparts, insisted that the responsibility rested on
individuals/institutions that had exploited these failures to their benefit, economic and
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otherwise. In other words, factory buildings did not just happen to be unsafe; deliberate
use of substandard materials by the owners rendered these structures unsafe.
The use of the term murder in the Financial Express editorial comment is also
instructive in that it emphasized the Bangladeshi newspaper’s view on the collapse of the
Rana Plaza — that it was the fallout of a series of devious and deviant acts by the owner
of the building, the owners of the factories housed therein, and people in power who had
overlooked their deviance and deviousness. Simply put, the Bangladeshi newspapers
framed the Rana Plaza as a criminal act that warranted retributive measures. Hence, much
of their Rana Plaza-related reports was concerned with the public demand for, and
progress in, the law enforcement, legal and judicial processes surrounding the collapse of
the building. For example, between April 28 and May 15, 2013, the New Nation carried
reports with headlines such as “Voice for justice gets louder,” “Rana placed on 15-day
remand,” “Arrest local MP Murad Jong,” “Rana Plaza engineer held,” “Savar Poura
[Municipal] Mayor suspended,” and “Victims’ families for capital punishment to Sohel
Rana.”
On the contrary, the British and U.S. newspapers chose to frame the Rana Plaza
collapse as an accident/tragedy that was beyond anyone’s control and thus incriminated
no individual or institution in particular. Such a framing warranted emphasis on assistive
measures such as monetary compensation and preventive measures such as factory
inspections and factory safety improvements. Intriguingly, the New York Times on April
27, 2013 quoted the Bangladesh information as saying: “I wouldn’t call it an accident…
[but] a murder.” Clearly, just as its Bangladeshi counterparts, the U.S. newspaper, too,
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had the option of framing the Rana Plaza incident as an act of crime occasioned by
deliberate (in)actions by certain individuals and institutions but chose not to.
Subsequently, the New York Times and other Western newspapers also chose not to
persist with questions that they had raised earlier in their coverage of the Rana Plaza
crisis, questions that pointed to not just moral but, perhaps, also legal responsibility of the
Western companies and institutions.
In its report published on April 26, 2013, the New York Times quoted a University
of California, Berkeley professor as saying:

Even in a situation of grave threat, when they saw cracks in the walls, factory
managers thought it was too risky not to work because of the pressure on them
from U.S. and European retailers to deliver their goods on time.

He also suggested that “these factories are cutting corners on fire safety and building
safety” because Western companies pay low prices for their products. In a similar vein,
the Guardian reported on April 26, 2013: “The tragedy has focused attention on the low
wages paid to Bangladeshi staff, whose cut-price labour allows shops in the west to clock
up large profits.” The New York Times also mentioned that three of the factories housed
in the Rana Plaza were given clearance by well-known Western factory monitoring
groups. It reported on April 27, 2013:

A leading factory monitoring group, the Business Social Compliance Initiative,
which is based in Brussels, said that two of the factories in the building — New
Waves Style and Phantom Apparel — were inspected and had complied with the
group’s code of conduct. Another factory in the building, Ether Tex, said on its
website that it had passed an inspection by a monitoring group in Düsseldorf,
Germany, the Service Organization for Compliance Audit Management. The
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website said Ether Tex was being evaluated by the Business Social Compliance
Initiative.

The report added though that these groups focused on if factories had smoke detectors or
whether they keep their exit doors locked, and that they left building structure or fire
escapes for the government inspectors to assess. Nonetheless, these explanations could
appear as mere excuses and the inspection by these groups, thus, as mere ethical
whitewash, which, apparently, the Western newspapers did not want to be part of the
discourse that they were advancing or maintaining. These incriminatory instances would
surely have come to the fore had they chosen to frame the Rana Plaza collapse as the
fallout of deliberate, and thus criminal, negligence. Such a framing would then have
implicated not just the owners of the building and the factories housed therein but also
the Western companies who outsourced their products to these factories at very low
prices. That was apparently never the intent. In fact, as I argue later, the discourse that the
Western newspapers advanced/maintained required the Western companies to be placed
on a high pedestal — moral and otherwise.
In sum, a murder/crime frame, which Bangladeshi newspapers generally pursued,
would have made Western companies vulnerable to be implicated, morally and perhaps
legally, for the Rana Plaza collapse and the concomitant loss of life and limb. On the
other hand, an accident/tragedy frame, which the Western newspapers espoused, made
these connections less obvious and allowed the Western companies to be projected as the
good Samaritans. To this end, the Western newspapers also cast Bangladesh in poor light,
which I discuss in the next section.
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Poor and Primitive, Inept and Inefficient:
Diagnosing Bangladesh as Cause
Governmental ineptitudes and governance failures in Bangladesh constituted a
common theme in much of post-Rana Plaza collapse reports, features, and editorial
comments by the U.K. and U.S. newspapers. From the beginning, these newspapers
sought to blame the Rana Plaza disaster on what they characterized as the country’s
systemic dysfunctionality. Governmental ineptitudes and governance failures, they
implied, made the Rana Plaza incident and the like in Bangladesh hardly surprising. The
Guardian reported on June 4, 2013 that a survey by Bangladeshi engineers had found 60
per cent of the garment industry buildings at risk of collapse. The British daily pointed
out though that the survey had only covered “a sixth of 600 buildings that house more
than 3,000 clothes factories” and quoted the survey team leader as saying that “there may
be lots of very vulnerable (factories) we don’t know about” but they “did not want to
create panic so we are saying they can run for the moment.” A day earlier, the New York
Times reported:

Inspecting Bangladesh’s garment factories is an acutely complicated task. No
government agency is certain of precisely how many such factories operate in
Bangladesh, or where they are. Some inspectors are discovering that building
plans filed with government agencies do not always match the actual buildings.
Many factories built during the 1980s and 1990s have no architectural drawings at
all.

In the wake of the Rana Plaza collapse, there was a surge in factory inspections, with the
Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association, a platform for apparel
factory owners, recruited 10 engineers for inspections. However,

53

… the inspection process quickly took on an ad hoc quality. One factory
executive complained of submitting to inspections from five different entities.
Most factories have not yet been inspected at all. Some brands have sent their
own inspection teams, including Tesco, the British retailer, which stopped placing
orders at one local garment maker, Liberty Fashions, after the chain’s inspectors
found structural problems in the factory — a finding angrily disputed by the
factory’s Bangladeshi owner.

On June 6, 2013, the Guardian reported a British government minister’s visit to the
Center for the Rehabilitation of the Paralyzed, a specialized medical facility funded by
Britain’s Department for International Development. The minister for international
development commented: “Bangladesh lacks the capacity to police employment rights,
health and safety measures, and building standards. The result is a tragedy like Rana
Plaza.” His assessment fit perfectly into the discourse the British and U.S. newspapers
apparently preferred—that systemic deficiency and dysfunctionality in Bangladesh had
made the Rana Plaza collapse an inevitability. Such a discourse preempted any possibility
of implicating the moral, if not legal, responsibility of the Western companies that
essentially exploited the systemic deficiency and dysfunctionality for their profit margins.
Moreover, these newspapers suggested, Bangladesh was incapable of not just
preventing a crisis of this magnitude but also handling post-crisis exigencies. Besides,
they indicated, the country did not have the capacity to even appreciate the assistance
afforded to it by the Western countries and companies at different times. The Telegraph,
for example, reported on May 1, 2003:

Bangladesh discarded hi-tech search equipment that could have saved people
trapped in the Dhaka building collapse. Thermal imaging and telescopic search
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cameras were given to Bangladesh in a UN aid package for disaster management
partly funded with £18million from Britain’s Department for International
Development.

The newspaper quoted the UN’s humanitarian affairs adviser as rebutting the Bangladesh
fire service training director’s assessment that the search equipment was not appropriate
for the conditions and lamenting that more lives could have been saved if the equipment
had been “correctly used.” It also quoted the project manager of the UN disaster
management project as suggesting that senior officers who had been trained how to use
the equipment did not pass on the knowledge to rescue workers at the Rana Plaza site.
The report ends with the UN disaster management official saying: “This is Bangladesh.”
It is noteworthy how the British daily pitches the opinions of two UN officials against
that of a Bangladesh fire service official, who apparently was more in touch with the
reality on the ground. The use of the UN official’s suggestive comment to end the report
is also noteworthy in that the statement was used as a kind of authoritative endorsement
of the newspaper’s damning indictment of Bangladesh’s disaster management capability.
Inadequacy of key facilities related to post-crisis exigencies was also the theme in
the May 31, 2013 report published in the New York Times. The report focused on the
struggle that Bangladesh’s only DNA laboratory was in, trying to identify the Rana Plaza
dead whose bodies were disfigured and/or decomposed beyond recognition. The U.S.
daily reported:

Founded in 2006 with a grant from the Danish Embassy, the lab is now
overwhelmed. Completing the DNA profiles could take months. New machines
are needed to decalcify the bone samples. Approval is still pending for expensive
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software capable of sorting through the tens of thousands of possible DNA
matches.

The report provides a detailed account of the personnel and logistics constraints that the
lab had to work under, not to speak of the pressure for expeditious identification of the
dead amidst allegation that the government was trying to save on compensation money
by concealing the actual fatality figures. The U.S. daily quoted the operations manager at
the lab as saying: “To handle normal situations, the lab is O.K. But now a whole year’s
caseload has come up, all of a sudden.” While the quote indicated the gravity of the
situation, the newspaper was more interested to use the lab as a representative case of
institutional and infrastructural inadequacy in Bangladesh. Hence, it wrote:

From the moment Rana Plaza collapsed, the scale of the disaster outstripped the
capacities of the Bangladeshi government. In the initial days, as dozens of bodies
were being pulled hourly from the wreckage, a nearby high school served as a
staging area for thousands of people looking for missing relatives or just gawking.
Bodies were placed in plank coffins and sprayed with disinfectant as lines of
people walked slowly past.

The suggestion seems to be that the government failed to protect not the just the lives but
also the identities of many killed in the Rana Plaza collapse because of inefficiency and
ineptitude of personnel, and inadequacy of infrastructure.
The predicament was grave for the survivors of the Rana Plaza collapse as well as
the rescue workers who pulled out people from the debris, dead or alive, according to the
Western media. The Washington Post reported on September 8, 2013 about the acute
shortage of trained mental health professionals in Bangladesh to help the survivors and
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rescue workers cope with the psychological trauma that they had been exposed to. It
wrote:
Nearly five months after the deadliest incident in garment manufacturing history,
the suffering is far from over for the victims, their relatives and the rescue
workers… activists and health-care professionals decry a lack of psychological
and financial support for scores of survivors and rescue workers stricken with
invisible handicaps.

To illustrate their predicament, the newspaper focused on the Center for the
Rehabilitation of the Paralyzed. The center

… has worked beyond its capacity to care for Rana Plaza’s injured. But because
of a dearth of trained mental health professionals, patients with symptoms of
acute psychological trauma receive “a minimum” of counseling before they are
discharged, said Hossain Mehedi, a doctor at the center.

It is notable that the institutions and initiatives in Bangladesh that were cast in positive
and sympathetic light by the British and U.S. newspapers were either funded or founded
by one Western country or the other. The underlying message apparently is that whatever
good there is in Bangladesh owes its existence to the West somehow.
In contrast, the public-sector institutions and initiatives were often either
downplayed or denigrated. The law enforcement and judicial failures were especially
highlighted. For example, the New York Times reported on May 3, 2013 the arrest of the
engineer who had warned that the Rana Plaza was unsafe a day before it collapsed. The
newspaper wrote:

The arrest of the engineer, Abdur Razzaque Khan, was a surprise twist since he
was regarded as something of a hero for trying to avert the April 24 disaster. A
day before the building collapsed, Mr. Khan had been summoned because cracks
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had suddenly appeared in the structure, forcing an evacuation. He concluded that
the building had become dangerous and should be closed until experts could
conduct a more thorough investigation — advice that turned out to be grimly
prescient.

Apparently, the arrest was made after the owner of the Rana Plaza as well as the owners
of the readymade garment factories situated therein had told the police, during
interrogation, that the engineer had told them that the cracks were not serious. Notably,
the U.S. newspaper had two days earlier depicted the owner of the Rana Plaza as “the
most hated Bangladeshi.” It wrote on May 1, 2013:

And perhaps no one wielded power more brazenly than Sohel Rana. He traveled
by motorcycle, as untouchable as a mafia don, trailed by his own biker gang.
Local officials and the Bangladeshi news media say he was involved in illegal
drugs and guns, but he also had a building, Rana Plaza, that housed five factories.
Upstairs, workers earned as little as $40 a month making clothes for retailers like
J. C. Penney. Downstairs, Mr. Rana hosted local politicians, playing pool,
drinking and, the officials say, indulging in drugs.

Yet, the suggestion seems to be, the law enforcement and investigation authorities banked
on the words of a villain to arrest a hero, whose words, if heeded to, could have averted
the death and injury to so many thousands. Implicit in this narrative seemed to be yet
another damning indictment — that such a system can hardly deliver justice.
Subsequently, the New York Times reported on June 30, 2013 the delay in a case
against Delwar Hossain, the owner of Tazreen Fashions, which caught fire in November
2012 because of what the government investigation concluded as gross fire safety
violations and negligence. The fire killed 112 workers “who were making clothes for
retailers like Walmart and Sears.” The newspaper wrote:
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The more pertinent question might be this: In Bangladesh, where the garment
industry powers the economy and wields enormous political clout, is it possible to
hold factory owners like Mr. Hossain accountable?

The question was pertinent because

Many garment factory owners are now entrenched in the nation's power elite,
some as members of Parliament. Garments represent 80 percent of the country's
manufacturing exports, giving the industry vast economic power, while factory
owners also finance campaigns during national elections, giving them broad
political influence.

Moreover, the New York Times added:

Bangladesh’s legal system has rarely favored anyone confronting the power
structure. Much of the legal code has remained intact since the British imperial
era, when laws were devised to control the population and protect the colonialist
power structure.

Hence, it continued:

Bangladeshi factories have always suffered fires and accidents, usually without
attracting international attention. One study estimated that more than 1,000
workers died in hundreds of factory fires or accidents from 1990 to 2012. Not
once was a factory owner charged with any crime, activists say.

Read together, these two reports in the New York Times suggest that the legal and judicial
systems are rigged in favor of the moneyed and the politically powerful, and that justice
in the Rana Plaza cases would remain elusive as that in the Tazreen Fashions case. Such
an undermining of any prospect for justice foregrounded compensation as a more viable
option for redress. Foregrounding compensation also meant that the Western companies
could be discursively afforded an elevated position. As will be shown in the next section,
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the British and U.S. newspapers reported the compensation in a way that make the
Western companies appear as the good Samaritans, contributing to the compensation
fund out of moral obligation, not out of any sense of guilt or remorse and/or real guilt or
remorse.
The Compensation Deal and the Good Samaritans
The British and U.S. newspapers never really framed the Rana Plaza collapse as a
fallout of the Western retail chains’ relentless pressure on apparel manufacturers to keep
the prices low, which, according to a workplace monitoring expert quoted in the New
York Times, forced the latter into “cutting corners on fire safety and building safety.”
Rather, they castigated these companies for not living up to, as the U.S. publication
reported on April 26, 2013, a promise that they had made in the wake of the November
2012 fire at Tazreen Fashions, “to take steps to ensure the safety of Bangladeshi factories
that make the goods the companies sell.” The Rana Plaza collapse, wrote the Washington
Post on October 24, 2014, exposed “earlier safety programs touted by Western retailers”
as “an ineffective and ultimately self-defeating ethical whitewash.” It was implicit in
their narrative that the Rana Plaza collapse with its staggering death toll was exclusively
the outcome of governmental ineptitudes and governance failures in Bangladesh and that
in no way should the Western companies be implicated, even morally, for the criminal
negligence surrounding the disaster. The New York Times carried a report on May 17,
2013 about two separate letters sent to the U.S. retailers, requesting them to “act together
to force changes in overseas workplace.” One of the letters, signed by religious groups
and investors, said:
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They [Tazreen Fashions fire and Rana Plaza collapse] are a grave indictment of
the human rights record of Bangladesh, and illustration of the failure of the global
companies that manufacture and sources their products there to ensure humane
working conditions.

These lines aptly reflect the distinction that the Western media narrative made between
criminal responsibility for the Rana Plaza disaster, which befell Bangladesh and
Bangladesh alone, and humanitarian responsibility for its victims, which the Western
companies chose to bear in the form of the global compensation fund. Thus, New York
Times on March 29, 2014 quoted a Gap spokesperson reminding everyone that the
company was “never linked to production at Rana Plaza” but contributed to the fund
anyway because it wanted “to see lasting change occur in Bangladesh.” The Guardian
similarly reported on March 28, 2014:

Asda and Gap have not been linked to Rana Plaza, but have chosen to make
donations alongside Walmart and The Children’s Place. The four retailers and
other unnamed companies have paid more than $5m to a humanitarian fund
operated by BRAC, a Bangladeshi anti-poverty organisation. It, in turn, is paying
$2.2m to the ILO-backed compensation fund and using the rest of the money for
counselling and rehabilitation for garment workers involved in the Rana Plaza
incident and for a “social safety net” for those affected by other workplace
disasters such as the Tazreen factory fire of 2012.
Again, in reporting Primark’s donation of ₤1 million in short-term aid for Rana Plaza
victims, the British daily quoted on June 8, 2013 a senior official at Associated British
Foods, which owns the British retail chain, as saying: “It is the right thing to do.” Thus,
the contribution by the Western companies to the compensation fund came to be
projected as a moral act, not an admission of guilt.
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At the same time, the compensation fund was itself trumpeted as a breakthrough,
a landmark. The New York Times reported on December 24, 2013:

The new fund is considered a landmark in compensating families of garment
industry victims, in terms of both the amount to be paid and the sophistication of
the arrangements… the families of the dead would receive, on average, more than
$25,000 each, while hundreds of workers who were injured or maimed would also
receive compensation. Per capita income in Bangladesh is about $1,900 a year.

The newspaper quoted the international coordinator of the Clean Clothes Campaign, a
European anti-sweatshop group, as saying:

We think the agreement is a really good result. The agreement will deliver to all
the victims and the families of the Rana Plaza disaster full and fair compensation
in a credible manner.

The daily also included a quote from the program director of an International Labor
Organization affiliate that glorified the compensation initiative at the expense of
Bangladesh’s reputation: “If you look at the history of compensation efforts in the
Bangladesh garment industry, it’s not a good one. But this is a potential breakthrough.”
An earlier New York Times report dated May 31, 2013 made a similar suggestion, noting:

[Bangladesh] Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has announced a compensation
package for families of those killed at Rana Plaza that could exceed $12,000, with
the money coming from public and private sources… Yet so far, only 150
families have received the first installment of about $1,100…

In fact, the Western newspapers tended to highlight Bangladesh’s poor record in a
particular area whenever they introduced a Western initiative relevant to the area.

62

Bangladesh was not always the only one at the receiving end of criticism, though.
Surrounding the compensation fund, the Guardian hardly missed an opportunity to
highlight the fact that Primark, a British retailer, was the first Western company to
commit and disburse compensation money for the dead and the wounded in the Rana
Plaza collapse. It reported on June 8, 2013:

After previous factory disasters, victims and their families have waited up to two
years for compensation. Primark, whose supplier employed less than 10% of the
Rana Plaza workforce, has pledged compensation to all victims. The company,
with the help of a local non-governmental organisation, has set up bank accounts
for victims to avoid money being siphoned off by unscrupulous middlemen.

In fact, the British daily frequently ran updates on Primark’s compensation initiative
while covering the initial refusal by Walmart and other U.S. retailers to contribute to the
fund. When the Walmart eventually donated to the fund, it quoted on March 28, 2014, the
general secretary of an international trade union as criticizing the contribution as “paltry.”
The newspaper did not forget to contrast Walmart’s contribution with Primark’s, either:

The sums are dwarfed by the efforts of the British retailer Primark, which has
paid $1m into the ILO-backed fund and is giving $9m in formal compensation
approved by the ILO to 580 people working for its supplier New Wave Bottoms,
which was on the second floor of Rana Plaza.

Moreover, when the compensation fund reached its $30 million target, the British daily
again singled out the U.S. retail chain as an example of why the fund took more than two
years and a substantial downward revision of $10 million to meet its target: “Walmart,
the world’s largest retailer with net sales of $482.2bn, donated an estimated $1m.” It was
as if the newspaper was on a mission to prove that the European companies in general
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and the British companies in particular, and even companies based in Canada, were more
conscientious and morally responsive than their U.S. counterparts. Most importantly, it
reflected the Western newspapers’ general preoccupation with the Western retailers in
respect of the compensation fund rather than how the delay in the fund’s meeting the
target affected the family of the dead and the wounded in the Rana Plaza disaster, on
which the Bangladeshi newspapers reported regularly.
Whenever the Financial Express or the New Nation reported on compensation for
the dead and the wounded in the Rana Plaza disaster, be it arranged or disbursed by the
Bangladesh government or the International Labor Organization or somebody else, the
report generally described the victims’ ordeal in the absence of such assistance. For
example, the Financial Express reported on October 24, 2013 about the predicament of a
young woman who worked on the third floor of Rana Plaza and survived its collapse. She
was quoted as saying:

I am lucky to survive while my brother is still missing… I have to look after the
two kids of my brother… I got the Primark payment but I am scared thinking
about the future when there would be no penny in my hand… how can I feed
those kids?

Again, on April 17, 2014, the Bangladeshi daily quoted a 15-year-old girl who worked on
the second floor of the ill-fated building as saying: “I am totally in the dark about my
future. I am unable to work and even can’t move easily.” The New Nation, on the other
hand, reported on April 22, 2014 the anti-corruption watchdog Transparency
International Bangladesh’s allegation of lack of transparency in the disbursement of
compensation payment and its recommendation for a “‘Garment Sector Governance

64

Authority’ to ensure transparency and accountability during implementation of different
initiatives and pledges by the government in the apparel sector.”
Moreover, albeit not so explicitly, the Financial Express questioned how the
global fund calculated the compensation package for the dead and the wounded. The
newspaper reported on May 15, 2013:

It is based on 500,000 taka [approximately $6,200] for pain and sufferings per
worker, and loss of income, based on an average salary of 5,833 taka
[approximately $72] per month (which includes two months bonus per year) for
10 years (injured workers) and 25 years (deceased workers).

It also mentioned that the same calculation was used in case of previous factory accidents
that took place in 2012–13. In contrast, when reporting on the individual compensation
package, the Western newspapers provided the total figure of $25,000 without any
detailed breakdown. A detailed breakdown would have shown, as the Financial Express
report did, the average wage factored into the compensation was not significantly more
than the “cut-price labor” that these papers consistently decried. Yet, the Western
newspapers portrayed the compensation plan as a landmark. The New York Times on
February 24, 2014 quoted an International Labor Organization representative as saying:

The significance of this is we have a mechanism that the whole industry can
support. We haven’t been able to say that before. What we had before was the
blame game.

The newspaper added in the very next paragraph:

Much of the finger-pointing has centered on the question of what responsibility
global brands should bear for accidents that occur in the factories that produce
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their garments. Some brands have been concerned that agreeing to participate in a
compensation fund for Rana Plaza victims could be interpreted as an admission of
guilt and become a vulnerability if litigation arises.

This essentially justified the initial reluctance to and subsequent delay by some Western
companies in committing money to the global compensation fund. Overall, the Western
newspapers appeared willing to gloss over the failure of several Western companies to
respond promptly by projecting the compensation fund as a breakthrough. The Guardian
on June 11, 2015 quoted the representative of an international labor union as saying:

The most important thing is that we did manage it — the workers of Bhopal are
still waiting for their money 30 years later. Next time, let’s make sure we get the
money faster so that we don't have years of painful campaigning in order to get
$30m, which is peanuts in comparison to the profits of this sector.

Again, the suggestion seemed to be that the compensation fund would not have
materialized had there not been mediation by the West. In other words, the reports in the
Western media had the strong undertone that international players had to join the
compensation efforts because the Bangladesh government did not have the capacity for,
and track record of, efficient management of such funds. The framing of the Western
establishments in general as good Samaritans, in turn, provided them with moral
superiority, which, coupled with their often touted skills and sophistication—technical,
technological, and otherwise, afforded them a kind of legitimacy to decide and dictate the
fate of Bangladesh’s garment industry. The Western newspapers trumpeted these
dictations and decisions, too, as the best the industry in particular and the country in
general could hope for.
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Moving Forward or Back to More of the Same?
In the immediate aftermath of the Rana Plaza collapse, Western retailers were in a
bind. As the British and U.S. newspapers reported, their first impulse was to distance
themselves from the factories housed in the ill-fated building. The New York Times
reported on May 1, 2013: “Several American and European retailers have sought to
minimize any ties they had to factories inside the building….” There were, according to a
Washington Post editorial comment published on October 24, 2014, even “discussions
about boycotting firms that do business in Bangladesh or punishing the country with
trade restrictions.” At the same time, there were pushbacks against such talks of boycott
and trade restrictions, with the major argument being that such measures would destroy
the life and livelihood of millions of garment workers in Bangladesh and, worst still,
bring the country’s economy crashing down. The New York Times on May 14, 2013
quoted an influential member of the Bangladesh government as likening the country’s
readymade industry with “the goose that lays the golden eggs,” which needed to be
nurtured and strengthened, not killed. The Guardian on June 6, 2013 quoted the then
British minister for international development as saying that Bangladesh’s garment
industry was a “massive success story that must not be allowed to go sour.” He added:

The industry has been built from nothing in the past 30 years and now needs to be
turned into a long-term development success… Regulations and enforcement
need to catch up with the rapid growth of this sector.”
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The argument, thus, was not to punish the industry for sustained indifference to factory
safety and other transgressions but bring it under a system that would address its many
deficiencies and drawbacks.
Besides developing their reports, features, and editorial comments around such
positive and sympathetic quotes and comments, the Western newspapers would also
advance, not so implicitly, humanitarian obligation as a further reason why Bangladesh’s
apparel industry needed to be sustained and strengthened. There were even suggestions
for overlooking gross malpractices that marked the industry. The Guardian, for example,
wrote on June 7, 2013:

The garment industry in Bangladesh employs about 3.5 million people, mainly
young women… Pay at factories is better than in other industries and despite long
hours, abuse from employers, poor job security and danger, sewing is less arduous
than alternative employment such as agricultural labour, construction work,
cleaning homes or ship-breaking.

In other words, the British daily acknowledged the malpractices that blight the industry
but maintained nonetheless that it was a price that workers had to pay because they had
very limited viable alternatives. The Washington Post offered a similar line of argument
in an editorial comment published on October 24, 2014:

The clothing industry has largely been a blessing for Bangladesh, a densely
populated country with huge amounts of spare workers seeking employment.
Actual per capita gross domestic product and actual income have doubled since
1997, in part because the country established itself as a center of ready-to-wear
apparel manufacturing… Demands for worker safety should not become a pretext
for protectionism, which would hurt the masses of poor who would be put out of
jobs.
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The major argument against any punitive Western measures against Bangladesh’s
clothing industry was ultimately not about any humanitarian ethic, although the Western
newspapers sought to project it as such. The Washington Post editorial dropped the hint
when it described the “$22 billion garment manufacturing business” as “a crucial global
production hub.” Simply put, the Western retailers could not afford to lose its service.
However, they could not publicly admit their dependence on cheap labor in countries like
Bangladesh that sustained their bottom line; they needed the cover of humanitarian ethic,
and the Western newspapers provided it.
The Western newspapers were critical of the Western retail chains’ tolerance of
non-compliance by their Bangladeshi suppliers with fire safety and factory construction
standards. The New York Times reported on May 14, 2013:

For years, Bangladesh has seen some of the worst practices in the global garment
industry. Wages are the lowest in the world, starting at roughly $37 a month.
Factory conditions are often unsafe. Yet global brands have often sought to
deflect any direct responsibility for the problems, while the government has often
been tepid in protecting worker rights.

The description followed right after the news that several European companies had
agreed “to a landmark plan to help pay for fire safety and building improvements after
the collapse last month of the Rana Plaza factory complex, which killed more than 1,100
people.” However, the report was generally positive in its coverage of the agreement, and
generously used positive quotes and comments about the European companies for leading
the initiative. The H&M was especially highlighted:
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H&M is the largest purchaser of garments from Bangladesh, and its endorsement
was seen as influential to other brands. The agreement calls for independent,
rigorous factory safety inspections with public accountability and mandatory
repairs and renovations underwritten by Western retailers. It also enhances the
roles played by workers and unions to ensure factory safety.

Three days later, the U.S. daily reported two separate initiatives by religious groups and
investors, imploring Walmart and other U.S. brands to join in the safety plan for
Bangladesh’s garment industry. In an open letter, a coalition of 118 religious groups and
investors urged these companies to reconsider their plans to institute individual factory
inspection programs. The letter read:

Acting alone, companies can and do bring about meaningful and positive changes
in human rights in the countries where they source and manufacture. But when
faced with intransigence of the type we have historically seen in Bangladesh on
worker safety issues, we are convinced that systemic change will only occur when
companies take action together.

The other initiative featured a similar open letter that read:

Regardless of whether products are being sourced from Bangladesh, Guatemala,
China or the Philippines, morality dictates that the price/value calculus for all
manufactured goods must begin with the fundamental human rights of workers…

The letters fit well into the narrative that the New York Times and other Western
newspapers advanced — that Bangladesh cannot improve the working condition in its
apparel industry on its own and that the Western retailers are morally bound to work
together and effect systemic change there.
The Guardian, too, reported on July 4, 2013 the British government’s plan “to use
its muscle to help drive up standards in factories supplying UK retailers” after the Rana
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Plaza tragedy. Subsequently, the U.S. retailers did not join the European platform but
launched their own factory safety initiative for Bangladesh. The two initiatives were
generally described in favorable terms in the Western newspapers. The Washington Post
on April 24, 2015 quoted an International Labor Organization official as touting the
progress of the two initiatives as “unprecedented” and not done “anywhere else in the
world… as quickly.” In sum, the West’s intervention was again projected as crucial,
bringing about changes in the garment industry that Bangladesh could not have hoped
for, let alone accomplish by itself.
As the preceding discussion indicates, two key factors characterize the coverage
of the Rana Plaza collapse and its aftermath by the newspapers under examination. First,
despite certain points of emphasis (e.g., the cause of the collapse and its impact on the
industry and individuals), the Western and Bangladesh newspapers framed the incident
differently. The difference in the identification of problem function (i.e., accident/tragedy
vs. murder) had a ripple effect on the other functions of the frames (i.e., diagnosis of
cause, passage of moral judgement, and suggestion of remedy; see Entman, 1993).
Second, the different frames that they deployed and their functions either informed or
were informed by the different discourses that the foreign and local newspapers advanced
or maintained surrounding the crisis. Despite the differences, these discourses also had at
least one point of convergence, in (re)shaping and (de)centering the identity of the people
who were most affected by the Rana Plaza incident: employees of the garment factories
housed in the building. In the next section, I discuss how the identity of the dead and the
wounded in the Rana Plaza collapse in particular and the Bangladeshi garment worker in
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general was discursively (re)created and (re)negotiated by the Western and Bangladeshi
newspapers.
A Case of Convergence: Discursive (Re)creation of
Worker/Victim Identity
The hero in the Western media discourse (i.e., the Western companies/West)
needed victims and found them in Bangladeshi garment workers, not just those killed or
wounded in the Rana Plaza collapse but the entire population of around 4 million, mostly
women. Right from the start of their coverage of the Rana Plaza disaster, the British and
U.S. newspapers described the Bangladeshi garment workers as a collective with very
little control over their life and livelihood. They worked long hours on the apparel factory
floors, and endured abuse from employers, poor job security and danger because sewing
was less arduous than agricultural labor, construction work, ship breaking, or home
cleaning, and, more importantly, because if they did not do it someone else would since
there were huge amounts of spare workers seeking employment in Bangladesh. The Rana
Plaza incident, in the Western media discourse, encapsulated and amplified the
helplessness and desperation that garment factory employees work with. Despite
anxieties about the crack that had developed in the building, they still went into the
factories and began working lest their refusal should render them jobless. On the other
hand, rampant and sustained violation of factory safety standards and worker rights
violation was the result of a general absence of trade unions in the country’s garment
sector. Just as garment workers had to rely on the whims and wishes of their employers
for their livelihood, the Rana Plaza victims and survivors also had to rely on the
government, the factory owners’ association, the Western retail chains, the international
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labor organizations for compensation. Overall, the Western media discourse lumped the
Rana Plaza dead and wounded in particular and garment workers in general into a
collective identity that was weak and helpless, denied and disempowered — the perpetual
victims, in other words.
The Western newspapers also used wage as a tool in their discursive construction
of the identity of the Rana Plaza dead and wounded. In fact, these newspapers displayed a
tendency to identify the dead or the wounded in terms of their wages. For example, in its
April 26, 2013 report, the Guardian described one young woman who worked in one of
the factories housed in the Rana Plaza:

Fatema Khatun Moni, 21, said she had come to Dhaka to ensure a better living for
her family back home in Naogaon. Her basic monthly wage was £38, £79 with
overtime. With that amount she financed her younger daughter’s education and
supported her parents.

Similarly, the New York Times reported the predicament of a young woman who lost her
sister in the Rana Plaza collapse:

Like so many young women in the country, the two sisters had gotten work in
garment factories to help support their families. Ms. Begum makes about $85 a
month; her sister made $56.

The identity marker thus was how much a person earned, not what they did on the factory
floor. Such discursive constructions, in turn, made the determination of compensation of
the Rana Plaza dead and wounded based on their lost income appear not just acceptable
but also normal. A human life was, thus, priced at some $12,500 and a human limb a
little less.
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As noted earlier, the Bangladeshi newspapers were implicitly critical of the way
that the compensation package for the Rana Plaza victims had been calculated. However,
their criticism appeared to be about the flaw in the calculation, not about the reduction of
identity that it entailed. Simply put, they might not have had any reservation if the Rana
Plaza compensation package had not been calculated based on the same rate as that
related to previous such industrial disasters. However, although these newspapers more
often than not portrayed the people affected by the Rana Plaza collapse as helpless and
reliant on national and international assistance, financial and otherwise, they did not paint
the garment workers as a hapless and helpless lot. In their discourse, workers were
willing to take to the street for their rightful dues.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have described how, despite emphasizing certain common points
related to the Rana Plaza collapse and its aftermath, the Western newspapers advanced a
discourse that was distinctively different from that advanced by the Bangladeshi
newspapers. I have also traced the difference in how they framed the Rana Plaza collapse,
arguing that the difference in problem identification subsequently led to differing cause
diagnosis, moral judgement, and remedy suggestion functions of their news frames. In
my discussion on the functions of the frames, across the first four sections of the chapter,
I have offered instances of the Western media’s use of a discursive strategy that glorified
the Western retail chains in particular and the West in general and, at the same time,
undermined Bangladesh. In the process, as I have argued in the fifth section, the Western
media discursively created the identity of anything Western as the quintessential hero
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while the Rana Plaza dead and wounded and the employees of Bangladesh’s garment
factories as the perpetual victims. I have also argued that the Bangladeshi media
advanced a discourse that might not have fully countered the Western media discourse
but nonetheless contradicted and critiqued some parts of it. In the next chapter, I discuss
how the findings tie in with the research questions of my thesis and, importantly, relate to
crisis communication research and scholarship.
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION(S)
My thesis project takes as its point of departure the questions “What insights
about crisis communication emerge in shifting from a traditional, functionalist to a
postcolonial theoretical framework?” and “How do Western and Bangladeshi newspapers
support and/or resist a colonial legacy in their framing of the Rana Plaza crisis?” Two
core epistemological exigencies frame these questions. First, an inherently managerial
commitment, functionalist/positivist theoretical orientation, and Western/U.S. bias render
analysis and assessment of crisis and crisis communication (especially in non-Western
setting by the dominant stream of crisis communication research and scholarship in the
United States) somewhat limited in scope and coverage. Second, the media articulate
local and postcolonial discourses when framing a crisis, advancing and/or maintaining
ideologies that (re)construct the crisis and (re)create the identity of individuals and
institutions that experienced the crisis. In this chapter, I discuss how the findings of my
critical discourse analysis of reports, features, and editorial comments on the Rana Plaza
collapse and its aftermath, by two newspapers each from the United Kingdom, United
States, and Bangladesh, tie back to the research questions and epistemological
assumptions that my thesis project is based on.
This chapter is divided into four sections. In the first section, I discuss how the
Guardian and Telegraph of the U.K., and the New York Times and Washington Post of
the US, in their framing of the Rana Plaza collapse and its aftermath, facilitated a
discourse that centers the Western apparel companies and the West by decentering the
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dead and wounded in the disaster, and the millions of employees in the Bangladeshi
apparel industry. I argue that the U.K. and U.S. newspapers’ discursive (re)construction
of the Rana Plaza crisis, and (re)creation of the identity of individuals, institutions, and
Bangladeshi government that experienced the crisis is colonial/imperial in both content
and effect. Next, I discuss how these findings complicate certain taken-for-granted
assumptions made by the dominant stream of crisis communication research and
scholarship in the U.S. In the second section, I argue that the Bangladeshi newspapers (in
some instances) contested the colonial/imperial discourse advanced by the foreign
newspapers and that these resistances were more sporadic than systematic, which may
reveal a lack of postcolonial awareness. However, I note that such sporadic discursive
resistance has certain implications for practitioners and researchers of crisis
communication. In the third and final section, I summarize how my thesis project
addresses certain limitations inherent in the dominant crisis communication research and
scholarship in the U.S. vis-à-vis crises in non-Western settings and, in the process,
contributes to a growing call for alternative ways of approaching and analyzing crisis
communication. I conclude with certain practical applications and heuristic directions
that my thesis project offers.
Discourse of Domination: Media Role in Crisis Redefined
Entman (1993) defined framing as selecting and making salient certain aspects of
an incident/issue “to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation,
moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (p. 52, emphasis in original). In
case of the Rana Plaza collapse, the Western newspapers emphasized frequent factory
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collapses and fires in Bangladesh’s readymade garment industry and thus defined the
incident in question as “not a surprise,” “a disaster waiting to happen” or, in other words,
an accident or tragedy that was inevitable and, hence, beyond anyone’s control. This
definition subsequently led to diagnosing Bangladesh’s systemic dysfunctionality,
governance failure, and governmental ineptitude as the cause. Bangladesh was projected
as a primordial hinterland, so to speak, where the nexus between politics and business,
rampant corruption, and ever-increasing socioeconomic inequity made such incidents as
the Rana Plaza collapse and associated loss of lives and limbs a recurring reality, and
rendered legal and judicial redress for people affected by these incidents elusive, if not
non-existent. Such problem definition and causal interpretation, in turn, led to the moral
evaluation that the authorities in Bangladesh were either unable or unwilling to
adequately compensate the dead and wounded of the Rana Plaza collapse on the one hand
and effectively initiate measures to prevent recurrences of such incidents on the other,
and that it was a moral imperative for the Western companies and, by implication, the
West to compensate the affected Bangladeshi apparel workers as acts of compassion
amidst an unfolding humanitarian crisis. Finally, the accident/tragedy frame provided the
treatment recommendation that the Western companies/West needed also to extend
financial and technical assistance for effective safety and standards inspections and
requisite corrective measures for apparel factories in Bangladesh so as to prevent
recurrence of similar incidents in the future and thus make sure that the “massive success
story” of Bangladesh’s garment industry does not “go sour.”
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The accident/tragedy frame, in its different functions, thus facilitates a discourse
that affords the Western companies/West, to borrow from Said (1978), a “positional
superiority” in their various interactions and relationships with the Bangladeshi garment
industry/Bangladesh wherein they never lose “the relative upper hand” (p. 7). It does so
in two distinctive ways. First, the portrayal of the Rana Plaza collapse as an exclusively
Bangladeshi problem effectively distances the Western apparel brands from any legal
culpability and/or moral responsibility for the death and injury of the several thousand
people who worked in the garment factories. Second, the characterization of their
involvement in and contribution to the compensation fund and factory inspection
initiatives as “the right thing to do” puts the Western companies on a moral high ground.
This positional superiority of the Western companies/West is carefully maintained even
when the Western media are critical of their past inactions and indifferences in respect of,
say, low wages for Bangladeshi apparel workers and unsafe conditions of Bangladeshi
apparel factories. These inactions and indifferences are, in fact, justified as acts of
compassion. For example, according to the British and U.S. newspapers, the companies
could have boycotted Bangladeshi apparel products as a punitive measure against these
malpractices but such a boycott would have resulted in the collapse of Bangladesh’s
garment industry and, in the process, adversely impacted the life and livelihood of
millions of Bangladeshis. In other words, the newspapers seem to suggest that the
decision not to boycott Bangladeshi products reflected farsightedness on the part of the
Western companies/West, which Bangladeshis in general might not have readily
recognized. The justification that the Western newspapers offered for the decision is,
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thus, an extension of the logic that what the Western companies/West do is sometimes
beyond the comprehension or capability of the Bangladeshis in general.
This dichotomy between “what ‘we’ do and what ‘they’ cannot do or understand
as ‘we’ do” (Said, 1978, p. 12) is also reinforced in the way local individuals and
institutions that worked tirelessly during the Rana Plaza rescue operation are portrayed in
the Western media. For example, although local fire fighters and service personnel
worked for days on end, rescuing the wounded and recovering the dead from the rubble,
the Western media discourse seeks to establish that they “could have saved more lives”
but for their inability or unwillingness to use the thermal imaging and telescoping search
cameras that the United Nations had provided Bangladesh with under a disaster
management program funded partially by the British Department for International
Development. In other words, the Western media overshadowed the heroics of the local
fire fighters and service personnel with these people’s purported lack of appreciation for
and/or ability to use the ‘sophisticated’ Western technology. Similarly, in case of the
part-time teacher who, according to a Washington Post report dated September 8, 2013,
“spent three days and nights mining the rubble for the living,” “searched the rows of
remains for items—cellphones, nose rings, scraps of paper—that might help with
identification,” and fought off “a pack of dogs that had gotten hold of an open body bag
with a corpse inside” late one night, the focus is also on his apparent lack of emotional
and psychological fortitude that has left him a psychological wreck self-medicating “with
a cocktail of antidepressants.” Such accentuation of institutional failures and individual
follies is unlikely to be coincidental since it, too, works towards maintaining the
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positional superiority of the Western companies/West vis-à-vis Bangladeshi garment
industry/Bangladesh.
Overall, the impression that one will likely get from the Western media coverage
of the Rana Plaza collapse and the crisis thereof is that, in Bangladesh, the social and
political elite are corrupt and exploitative, the government is inept and governance
nonexistent, and the people are well-intentioned but ill-equipped to take care of
themselves, let alone others. The garment industry, the readers are reminded time and
again, is a rare success story that, too, risks “go[ing] sour” amidst rampant malpractices
ranging from low wages for workers to life-threatening working conditions. Importantly,
these are often cast as “worker” (i.e., Bangladeshi) rather than managerial (i.e., Western)
problems. The apparel workers, the readers are told, have to bear with the gross
mistreatment and injustice because pay in the garment industry is better than other sectors
and employment is difficult to come by in this densely-populated country. Here, it is
important to point out that the typical Bangladeshi garment worker in the Western media
discourse is a vulnerable young woman whose life revolves around the pittance that she
gets in wage from the garment factory she works in. Much like the Egyptian courtesan
that Flaubert encountered (Said, 1978), she too cannot speak for herself and needs to be
“spoken for and represented” (p. 6). In sum, Bangladesh is discursively (re)constructed as
being in the civilizational backwaters (i.e., dysfunctional system, absence of governance)
and the people of Bangladesh being either ethically/morally compromised (i.e., corrupt
and exploitative social and political elite) or financially/legally vulnerable (i.e., millions
of unemployed people and millions more exploited workers).
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The British and U.S. newspapers’ reports, features, and editorial comments on the
Rana Plaza collapse and its aftermath discursively (re)construct Bangladesh and
Bangladeshis as antithesis to the West/Western companies, much like the Orientalists
(re)imagined the Orient and Orientals vis-à-vis the Occident and Occidentals (Said,
1978). This discursive (re)production of the West/rest, us/them, self/other dichotomies is
driven by a similar motivation of dominance. The (re)assertion of the West as “the
normative center of the world” (Rao, 2011, p. 792) ultimately (re)produces the
justification for the Western companies to decide that financial compensation, not judicial
redress, is what the dead and wounded of the Rana Plaza collapse need, and to dictate the
present and future of the Bangladesh apparel industry that, regardless of mortal risk to
and endless exploitation of workers, production must continue and its “massive story of
success must not be allowed to go sour.”
Tyler (2005) noted that crisis renders the “dominant narrative” that an
organization strives to advance/maintain about itself open to public contest (p. 567). The
dominant stream of crisis communication research and scholarship in the United States
often notes the media’s formidable capacity to spearhead this public challenge to an
organization’s official story in view of their wider access and acceptability to the mass
audience. Crisis communication scholars are unanimous that the media play a crucial role
during crises (Sellnow & Seeger, 2013), advise organizations to maintain close links with
the media (Fearn-Banks, 2009), and even suggest active participation in the media’s
framing of crisis so organizations could maintain a positive image (Holladay, 2009).
They are also unanimous that crisis managers should learn from previous high-profile
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crises such as the Challenger explosion or the anthrax scare in the U.S. and be cautious
but candid with the media during crisis events to avert similar fallouts. In sum, crisis
communication scholars often portray the media as a potential and formidable threat to an
organization’s image/reputation or another organization to be cultivated/exploited to
further organizational goals (i.e., image repair/maintenance).
The post-Rana Plaza collapse news coverage, especially by the Western media
organizations, complicates this taken-for-granted dynamic between the media and the
organization during a crisis, though. The Guardian, Telegraph, New York Times, and
Washington Post generally advanced these companies’ world view (Grunig, 1989) and
thus protected their interests. The Western media indeed criticized the international
apparel brands based in North America and Europe on occasions but these criticisms did
not, in any way, detract from their grand narrative about the Western companies and the
West. On the contrary, these criticisms helped maintain their oft-trumpeted
neutrality/objectivity and, in the process, reinforced the credibility of the discourse that
they advanced/maintained. Millner, Veil, and Sellnow (2010) postulated how a thirdparty organization, preferably an industry representative, can step in as proxy crisis
communicators to fill the information void caused by the reticence/reluctance of the
offending organization(s), with the objective of such communication often being defense
of the offending organization(s) and the relevant industry. They also argued that proxy
crisis communicators “cope with media adversity” (p. 75) among many other constraints.
In case of the Rana Plaza crisis, however, the Western companies did not face any media
adversity in the true sense of the term. In fact, they found in the media effective proxy
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crisis communicators that ultimately repaired their collective image and defended their
long-term interest due to the intersecting interests of neoliberal capitalism and colonial
paternalism.
The Western media could also be viewed as having played a public relations
function in their discursive (re)construction of the Rana Plaza collapse and its aftermath
and consequent (re)creation of identities of the institutions and individuals that
experienced the crisis by affording the Western companies the relative upper hand
through and through. Bergquist (1993) noted that every organization seeks to circulate a
fiction in the name of an official story that “everyone is supposed to accept as true, yet
which no one believes to be true” (p. 126). The Western media’s portrayal of the
international apparel brands as morally responsive and socially responsible in their postRana Plaza news coverage looks to be an extension of that fiction. Munshi and Kurian
(2005) critiqued the notion of corporate social responsibility as resting “on a platform of
insincerity … [that is] manifested in the privileging of key public such as shareholders
over what are deemed to be peripheral publics (i.e., the masses of people who bear the
brunt of corporate actions)” (p. 514). In case of the Rana Plaza crisis, the Western media
actively privileged the interest of the Western companies by advancing/maintaining a
discourse that first absolves them of any legal/moral responsibility for the incident and
consequent loss of so many lives and then glorifies them as good Samaritans standing by
Bangladeshi apparel workers, and not just the Rana Plaza dead and wounded, amid an
unfolding humanitarian crisis. A compelling example of such privileging is their
unqualified endorsement of the West-led international compensation initiative that
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calculated the individual compensation package based on wages in the Bangladeshi
garment industry that the Western media themselves have often critiqued as inadequate
and inhumane.
In this section, I have argued how a postcolonial theory-driven critical discourse
analysis of the news coverage of the Rana Plaza collapse and its aftermath, especially by
the Guardian and Telegraph of the United Kingdom, and the New York Times and
Washington Post of the United States, complicates and challenges, on at least three
counts, how the mainstream crisis communication research and scholarship in the U.S.
explicates the role of the media vis-à-vis organizational crises. First, it is more productive
to view the role of the media in terms of conveyors of and contributors to the social
discourse surrounding a crisis — and not merely as a conduit in a linear communication
process that channels to the public information they gather from and/or provided with by
the organization. Such a recognition facilitates a better understanding of the media’s
active and effective role in not just informing but also influencing the social discourse
surrounding a crisis. Second, it is too simplistic to view the media exclusively as an
adversary vis-à-vis the beleaguered organization/s during a crisis. Such a view precludes
the possibility that the media can and may play the proxy crisis communicator and even
the public relations manager for the organization/s in crisis when various dominant
discourses (e.g., capitalism and colonialism) coalesce to create a coherent, preferred
dominant script. Third, and perhaps most important, whether the mainstream Western
media discourse surrounding a crisis will favor or disfavor the relevant organization/s is
not necessarily consequent upon the candor and cooperation and/or caution exercised by
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the crisis managers in their engagements with the media. As they are “largely subservient
to corporate interests” (Kellner, 2005, p. 181), the mainstream corporate media are only
likely to advance/maintain discourses that protect and promote such interests.
In the next section, I discuss the limited discursive resistance offered by the local
newspapers to the West-centered narrative advanced by their Western counterparts, and
also explain why and how recognition of this resistance could be productive for crisis
communication researchers and scholars.
Discourse of Resistance: A Pushback from the Periphery
A crucial difference in the post-Rana Plaza collapse coverage between the four
Western and two Bangladeshi newspapers was in how they framed the crisis. The
Financial Express and New Nation defined the death of more than 1,100 apparel workers
in the Rana Plaza collapse as “murder,” caused by individual/institutional negligence.
Such problem definition and causal interpretation shaped the other two functions of the
frame — moral evaluation (i.e., owners of the building and the garment factors, and their
cohorts should be prosecuted in criminal courts), and treatment recommendation (i.e.,
judicial redress is key to preventing to recurrence of such incidents in future). The
discourse that the murder frame, with its various functions, informed/was informed by,
albeit disjointed, differed from and was, to a certain extent, defiant of/resistant to the
Western media discourse.
A major instance of such resistance relates to how the Bangladeshi newspapers
pushed back at the Western media’s discursive (re)production and reduction of the
identities of the Rana Plaza dead and wounded as “victims” and thus without any agency.
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They dedicated significant space to the coverage of demonstrations and agitations by the
Rana Plaza workers for not just financial but also legal redress. Van Dijk (1993) noted
that carrying placards and/or shouting slogans during such public events provides an
avenue for the ordinary or marginalized people to access social discourse. Moreover, Kim
and Dutta (2009) argued that such mobilizations signify the marginalized people’s
agency on one hand and their engagement in crisis communication on the other.
Significant coverage of these agitations and demonstrations by the local newspapers,
therefore, sought to reclaim the agency for Rana Plaza workers, which the Western media
tended to discursively take away from them.
However, the local newspapers’ resistance to the discourse advanced/maintained
by their Western counterparts was too sporadic and incoherent to be regarded a
manifestation of their postcolonial awareness. For example, although these newspapers
pushed back at the Western newspapers’ discursive denial of the Rana Plaza workers’
agency, they also unquestioningly accepted and deployed Western terms (e.g., victim) in
their news reports, features, and editorials. Moreover, their criticism of the individual
compensation packages for the dead and wounded of the Rana Plaza collapse was mostly
directed at what they identified as flaws in the calculation process, not in the process by
which Western companies granted themselves the power to initiate, fund, and ultimately
control the compensation process (usurping a judicial remedy to the situation). Similarly,
that these compensation packages also reduced the Rana Plaza workers’ identity into
workers, determined only by their wages, did not appear to be much of the local
newspapers’ concern. In other words, had their discursive challenges been enabled by a
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postcolonial awareness, they would have strongly criticized such capitulation to Western
capitalism and the reduction of Bangladeshis’ identity instead of accepting and
perpetuating them.
Yet, albeit inconsistent and incoherent, this (re)assertion of the Rana Plaza
workers’ agency by the Bangladeshi newspapers, challenging the dominant British-U.S.
media discourse surrounding the crisis, is significant for crisis communication research
and scholarship in several ways. It shows how different individuals/institutions construct
“their own social reality” surrounding a crisis and how these social realities “compete
with each other” for ideological domination or, in other words, for collective acceptance
as “right, just, or acceptable” (McHale et al., 2007, pp. 375–376). As is often the case, the
reality of the marginalized people goes unsaid, unheard, and unheeded because, unlike
business conglomerates, for instance, they do not have “access to the platforms of public
sphere,” let alone “the power to control information” or the “agenda-setting power” (Kim
& Dutta, 2009, p. 147). However, in disrupting the dominant narrative, a crisis creates
opportunities for the marginalized people “to make their positions public and to elicit
support” (Waymer & Heath, 2007, p. 106). Moreover, whose reality ultimately wins the
discursive struggle for ideological dominance depends on the convergence of “power and
influence in favor of particular players over others at a particular time” (McHale et al.,
2007, p. 378). The post-Rana Plaza collapse news coverage by the local newspapers
suggests that the access to social discourse could be widening for the marginalized people
and could over time afford them a stronger position in discursive (re)negotiations of
reality, to successfully challenge the generally pro-Western corporate discourse.
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The reports, features, and editorial comments on the Rana Plaza incident and its
aftermath by the Financial Express and New Nation also indicate that local newspapers
could be a productive site for exploration and examination of alternative discourses
surrounding a crisis that occurs in a non-Western setting but involves Western
organization/s. Globalization may have seen the rise of corporate media that largely serve
Western interest (Artz, 2003; Kellner, 2005; Murphy, 2003) but it has also been marked
by a “reassertion of local identities” (Christians, 2005, p. 3). In the event of a crisis
involving Western companies and impacting Western corporate interest, this impulse to
(re)claim and (re)assert local identities may lead local newspapers to seek out discourses
that are different from, if not resistant to, the Western media discourse.
In this section, I have discussed how the local newspapers discursively challenged
the Western media narrative surrounding the Rana Plaza collapse and the crisis thereof. I
have argued that, although limited, these challenges have implications for crisis
communication research and scholarship. In the next section, I summarize how my thesis
project highlights certain inherent weaknesses in the dominant strand of crisis
communication research and scholarship in the United States and offers explain how it
contributes to the growing call for a reconceptualization of crisis communication.
Reconceptualizing Crisis Communication
The organization-centricity of the mainstream crisis communication research in
the United States has its roots in public relations research. Crisis communication is still
viewed primarily as a public relations function (Fearn-Banks, 1996/2002). Moreover, as
discussed in Chapter 1, public relations scholars have not only built the foundational
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framework of crisis communication but also conducted the bulk of crisis communication
research since its emergence as a discernible academic discipline. This organizationcentricity has resulted in an essentially reductionist conceptualization of crisis as a
phenomenon that only disrupts an organization’s normal operations, and adversely affects
its products and services, revenue and profit, publics or stakeholders, image and
reputation, and crisis communication as a process that only an organization engages in to
restore operational normality and minimize such negative impacts (Coombs, 2009, 2012;
Fearn-Banks, 1996/2002; Seeger et al., 2003; Seeger & Sellnow, 2013). On the other
hand, communication per se is viewed as a linear, top-down process where the message
flows from the organization to its publics, and the receiver (i.e., the public/s) interprets
and understands the message just as the sender (i.e., the organization) intends it to be
interpreted and understood by the receiver (i.e., the public/s). In other words, the success
and failure of crisis communication is seen in terms of the efficacy of the message; hence,
the emphasis is on text without any consideration for context (Curtin & Gaither, 2005;
Karlberg, 1996). This inordinate emphasis on text at the expense of context is the result
of what could be called an ethnocentric understanding of organization and its publics,
with the underlying assumption being that the Western/U.S. model for interaction
between the organization and its publics is applicable across boundaries — geographical,
cultural and otherwise (Lee, 2005; Wakefield, 1996).
A great deal of crisis communication research in the U.S. locates “all power to
respond and to manage a crisis in the organization” (McHale et al., 2007, p. 378). Even
studies that purportedly assess and analyze the audience reaction to and reception of
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crisis communication do so with a view to enhancing the efficacy of the organizational
communicative practices and strategies (e.g., Smith et al., 2012). Even the role of the
media, crucial in respect of their capacity for rapid dissemination of information and
access to the masses (Seeger & Sellnow, 2013), is mostly theorized in relation to their
reaction to the organization’s crisis management and crisis communication efforts (e.g.,
Littlefield & Quenette, 2007), as is the role of the government and other regulatory
entities (e.g., Smithson & Venette, 2013). This postulation of the organization as the
locus of power constrains the dominant crisis communication research in the U.S. —
epistemologically, ontologically, and axiologically. Although ordinary people suffer
infinitely more than an organization’s owners and managers (Heath, 2012), their crisistime communication is rarely explored as a productive site for crisis communication
(epistemology). Similarly, crisis communication is seldom examined as discourse
(ontology) and evaluated in terms of its role in maintaining or challenging power
relations in society (axiology). Overall, the dominant stream of crisis communication
research in the U.S. continues to overlook alternative epistemological, ontological, and
axiological possibilities inherent in crisis communication in its preoccupation with the
communicative practices and strategies put in place by an organization during crises, and
their effectiveness or lack thereof.
On the contrary, if crisis is conceptualized as a social phenomenon (Heath, 2012),
a central feature of the postcolonial approach in my project, it decenters the organization
as the sole source of power to respond to and manage a crisis and locates such power also
“in the audiences and all kinds of institutions that relate to it” (McHale et al., 2007,
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p. 378). Such a (re)conceptualization of crisis and crisis communication, in turn,
foregrounds the discursive terrain whereby multiple sources such as the organization/s,
regulators, activists, and, to a limited extent, even the marginalized people affected most
by a crisis, compete with their respective realities about the crisis (Davis & French, 2008;
Hearit & Courtright, 2003) for ideological dominance (McHale et al., 2007). Such
diffusion of power to initiate and maintain crisis response also means displacement of the
organization as the sole site to explore and examine crisis communication practices and
strategies, and thus warrants recognition of many other productive sites for such
exploration and examination, including but not limited to the media, both global and
local.
A focus on the discursive nature of crisis communication also foregrounds how
communication in general perpetuates or challenges power relations in society. This
attention to power dynamics renders problematic certain taken-for-granted assumptions
of dominant crisis communication research and scholarship in the U.S. In case of the
Rana Plaza crisis, for example, the Western media and the Western companies
complemented, not competed, each other with a view to maintain a discourse that seeks
to entrench West’s neoliberal capitalism and neocolonial paternalism. This interest
convergence between the Western companies and the mainstream Western media could
seem far-fetched if, following the logic and practices of the dominant strand of research
and scholarship in the U.S., media coverage is analyzed as disparate texts, not as part of a
discourse. As noted earlier, the British and U.S. criticized the Western companies on
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occasions but these criticisms did not detract from the overarching discourse that favored
these companies and, by implication, the West.
Again, the implication of this reasoning is that it hardly leaves any space for crisis
communication research and scholarship to claim, let alone assert, value-neutrality. The
post-Rana Plaza crisis news coverage by the British and U.S. newspapers clearly
obfuscates the moral responsibility of the Western companies in particular and the West
in general for not effectively addressing, let alone redressing, the vulnerability of the
workers to economic exploitation in terms of multiple malpractices in the Westernfinanced Bangladeshi garment industry and even mortal danger in terms of the unsafe
factories they work in. Theorizing on this obfuscation as either a communicative
technique or a discursive strategy has to recognize not just its textual efficiency but also
its contextual effect, which, in this case, is the perpetuation of a status quo that gives
precedence to the financial benefit of the Western companies over the existential angst of
the Bangladeshi garment workers.
Implications and Future Directions
A relative novelty of my thesis project is the deployment of postcolonial theory as
a theoretical framework and critical discourse analysis as a methodological tool to
analyze Western and Bangladeshi media discourse surrounding the Rana Plaza crisis. A
postcolonial theory-driven critical discourse analysis as a crisis communication research
protocol promises considerable heuristic possibilities especially in examining crisis
involving Western companies in postcolonial societies. Such examinations could be
helpful to understand if the apparent corporate and colonial/imperial bent in the Western
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media discourse surrounding the Rana Plaza crisis is an exception or the norm. Also,
given that Bangla the language of nearly the entire population in Bangladesh and Banglalanguage newspapers heavily outweigh their English-language counterparts in terms of
circulation and access to the populace, it would be intriguing to carry out a comparative
discourse analysis between these two types of publication. Such an analysis could be
instructive insofar as assessment of their postcolonial awareness is concerned. In view of
the English-language newspapers’ access to and influence on the social and political elite,
and in view of a general tendency of the social and political elite in postcolonial countries
to hold on to a colonial legacy, it could be interesting to see if these media organizations
are enslaved by the colonial/imperial discourse or enabled by a postcolonial awareness.
Conclusion
My thesis project diverges from the dominant branch of crisis communication
research and scholarship in the U.S. in its (re)conceptualization of crisis as social
phenomenon and crisis communication as discourse vis-à-vis the Rana Plaza collapse and
its aftermath. This foregrounding of the social dimension of crisis and the discursive
dimension of crisis communication brings into focus how events are (re)constructed and
identities are (re)produced, discursively, to maintain or challenge power relations in
society. Most importantly, such (re)conceptualizations create the scope and space to
question certain taken-for-granted assumptions of the mainstream crisis communication
research in the U.S., as my analysis of the coverage of the Rana Plaza crisis by Western
and Bangladeshi newspapers does in respect of the relational dynamics between the
media and the organization(s) in crisis.

94

REFERENCES
Alexander, R. J. (2013). Shaping and misrepresenting public perceptions of ecological
catastrophes: The BP Gulf oil spill. Critical Approaches to Discourse Analysis
across Disciplines, 7(1), 1-18. doi: 10.1007/s10551-012-1222-9

An, S.-K., & Cheng, I.-H. (2012). Crisis communication research in public relations
journals: Tracking research trends over thirty years. In W. T. Coombs & S. J.
Holladay (Eds.), The handbook of crisis communication (pp. 65-90). Malden,
MA: Wiley-Blackwell.

Artz, L. (2003) Globalization, media hegemony, and social class. In L. Artz & Y. R.
Kamalipour (Eds.), The globalization of corporate media hegemony (pp. 3-32).
Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Bangladesh official: Disaster not ‘really serious’. (2013, May 3). USA Today. Retrieved
from http://www.usatoday.com

Bangladesh Protidin tops circulation list. (2014, March 11). The Daily Star. Retrieved
from http://www.thedailystar.net/bangladesh-pratidin-tops-circulation-list-15026

Berger, B. K. (1999). The Halcion affair: Public relations and the construction of
ideological world view. Journal of Public Relations Research, 11(3), 185-203.
doi: 10.1207/s1532754xjprr1103_01

Bergquist, W. (1993). The postmodern organization: Mastering the art of irreversible
change. San Francisco, CA: Jossy-Bass Publishers.

Botan, C. H., & Taylor, M. (2004). Public relations: State of the field. Journal of
Communication, 645-661. doi: 10.1111/j.1460-2466.2004.tb02649.x

Burney, S. (2012). Pedagogy of the other: Edward Said, postcolonial theory, and
strategies for critique. New York, NY: Peter Lang.

95

Campbell, C. (2013, April 26). Dying for some new clothes: Bangladesh’s Rana Plaza
tragedy. Time. Retrieved from http://www.time.com

Cheney, G., & Christensen, L. T. (2001a). Public relations as contested terrain: A critical
response. In R. L. Heath (Ed.), The handbook of public relations (pp. 167-182).
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Cheney, G., & Christensen, L. T. (2001b). Organizational identity: Linkages between
internal and external communication. In F. M. Jablin & L. Putnam (Eds.), The
new handbook of organizational communication: Advances in theory, research,
and methods (pp. 231-265). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Cheregi, B. F. (2015). The discursive construction of Romanian immigration in the
British media: Digitized press vs. television documentaries. Romanian Journal of
Communications and Public Relations, 17(2), 54-73.

Christians, C. G. (2005) Ethical theory in communications research. Journalism Studies,
6(1), 3-14. doi: 10.1080/1461670052000328168

Cole, T. W., & Fellows, K. L. (2008). Risk communication failure: A case study of New
Orleans and Hurricane Katrina. Southern Communication Journal, 73(3), 211228. doi: 10.1080/10417940802219702

Coombs, W. T. (2009). Conceptualizing crisis communication. In R. L. Heath, & H. D.
O’Hair (Eds.), The handbook of risk and crisis communication (pp. 99-118). New
York, NY: Routledge.

Coombs, W. T. (2010). Crisis communication: A developing field. In R. L. Heath (Ed.),
The SAGE handbook of public relations (pp. 477-488). Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage.

Coombs, W. T. (2012). Parameters for crisis communication. In W. T. Coombs & S. J.
Holladay (Eds.), The handbook of crisis communication (pp. 17-53). Malden,
MA: Wiley-Blackwell.

96

Craig, R. T. (1999). Communication theory as a field. Communication Theory, 9(2), 119161. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2885.1999.tb00355.x

Curtin, P. A., & Gaither, K. G. (2005). Privileging identity, difference, and power: The
circuit of culture as a basis for public relations theory. Journal of Public Relations
Research, 17(2), 91–115. doi: 10.1207/s1532754xjprr1702_3

D’Angelo, P., & Kuypers, J. A. (2010). Introduction: Doing news framing analysis. In P.
D’Angelo & J. A. Kuypers (Eds.). Doing news framing analysis: Empirical and
theoretical perspective (pp. 1-13). New York, NY: Routledge.

Davis, M. J., & French, T. N. (2008). Blaming victims and survivors: An analysis of
post-Katrina print news coverage. Southern Communication Journal, 73(3), 243257. doi:10.1080/10417940802219736

de Vreese, C. H. (2005). News framing: Theory and typology. Information Design
Journal & Document Design, 13(1), 51–62.

Disaster in Bangladesh: Rags in the ruins. (2013, May 4). The Economist. Retrieved from
http://www.economist.com

Elliott, D., & Ozar, D. (2010). An explanation and a method for the ethics of journalism.
In C. Meyers (Ed.). Journalism ethics: A philosophical approach (pp. 9-24). New
York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Entman, R. M. (1993). Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. Journal of
Communication, 43(4), 51-58. doi: 10.1111/j.1460-2466.1993.tb01304.x

Entman, R. M. (2010). Framing media power. In P. D’Angelo & J. A. Kuypers (Eds.).
Doing news framing analysis: Empirical and theoretical perspective (pp. 331356). New York, NY: Routledge.

Fairclough, N. (2001). Critical discourse analysis as a method in social scientific
research. In R. Wodak & M. Meyer (Eds.), Methods of critical discourse analysis
(pp. 121-138). London, England: Sage.

97

Fairclough, N., & Wodak, R. (1997). Critical discourse analysis. In T. A. van Dijk (ed.),
Discourse as social interaction: Discourse studies 2 (a multidisciplinary
introduction) (pp. 258-284). London, England: Sage.

Falkheimer, J., & Heide, M. (2006). Multicultural crisis communication: Towards a
social constructionist perspective. Journal of Contingencies and Management,
14(4), 180-189. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-5973.2006.00494.x

Falkheimer, J., & Heide, M. (2009). Crisis communication in a new world: Reaching
multicultural publics through old and new media. Nordicom Review, 30(1), 55-65.

Falkheimer, J., & Heide, M. (2014). From public relations to strategic communication in
Sweden: The emergence of a transboundary field of knowledge. Nordicom
Review, 35(2), 123-138.

Fearn-Banks, K. (1996/2002). Crisis communications: A casebook approach (2nd Ed).
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Fearn-Banks, K. (2009). Crisis communication: A review of some best practices. In R. L.
Heath (Ed.), The handbook of public relations (pp. 479-486). Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage.

Fisherman, D. A. (1999). Valujet Flight 592: Crisis communication theory blended and
extended. Communication Quarterly, 47(4), 345-375. doi:
10.1080/01463379909385567

Genilo, J. W., Asiuzzaman, M., & Osmani, M. M. H. (2016). Small circulation, big
impact: English language newspaper readability in Bangladesh. Advances in
Journalism and Communication, 4(1), 127-148. doi: 10.4236/ajc.2016.44012

Grossberg, L. (2002). Postscript. Communication Theory, 12(3), 367-370. doi:
10.1111/j.1468-2885.2002.tb00274.x

98

Grunig, J. E. (1989). Symmetrical presuppositions as a framework for public relations. In
C. H. Botan, & V. Hazleton, Jr. (Eds.), Public relations theory (pp. 17-44).
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Ha, J. H., & Boynton, L. (2014). Has crisis communication been studied using an
interdisciplinary approach? A 20-year content analysis of communication
journals. International Journal of Strategic Communication, 8(1), 29-44.
doi:10.1080/1553118X.2013.850694

Hartley, J., & Montgomery, M. (1985/2016). Representations and relations: Ideology and
power in press and TV news. In T. A. van Dijk (Ed.), Discourse and
communication: New approaches to the analysis of mass media discourse and
communication (pp. 232-260). New York, NY: de Gruyter.

Hearit, K. M., & Courtright, J. L. (2003). A social constructionist approach to crisis
management: Allegations of sudden acceleration in the Audi 5000.
Communication Studies, 54(1), 79-95. doi: 10.1080/10510970309363267

Heath, R. L. (1995) Environmental risk communication: Cases and practices along the
Texas gulf coast. In B. R. Burelson (ed.) Communication yearbook, 18 (pp. 225277). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Heath, R. L. (2012). Crisis communication: Defining the beast and de-marginalizing key
publics. In W. T. Coombs & S. J. Holladay (Eds.), The handbook of crisis
communication (pp. 1-13). Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.

Heath, R. L., Li, F., Bowen, S. A., & Lee, J. (2008). Narratives of crisis planning and
infectious disease: A case study of SARS). In M. W. Seeger, T. L. Sellnow, & R.
R. Ulmer (Eds.), Crisis communication and the public health (pp. 131-156).
Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.

Heath, R. L., & O’Hair, H. D. (2009). The significance of crisis and risk communication.
In R. L. Heath, & H. D. O’Hair (Eds.), The handbook of risk and crisis
communication (pp. 5-30). New York, NY: Routledge.

99

Holladay, S. J. (2009). Crisis communication strategies in the media coverage of
chemical accidents. Journal of Public Relations Research, 21(2), 208-217. doi:
10.1080/10627260802557548

Holladay, S. J. (2012). Are they practicing what we are preaching? An investigation of
crisis communication strategies in the media coverage of chemical accidents. In
W. T. Coombs & S. J. Holladay (Eds.), The handbook of crisis communication
(pp. 159-180). Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.

Islam, K. (2016, April 24). Rana Plaza tragedy: Trials yet to take off. New Age. Retrieved
from http://www.newagebd.net

Johansson, C. (2007). Research on organizational communication: The case of Sweden.
Nordicom Review, 28(1), 93-110.

Karlberg, M. (1996). Remembering the public in public relations research: From
theoretical to operational symmetry. Journal of Public Relations Research, 8(4),
263-278. doi: 10.1207/s1532754xjprr0804_03

Kavoori, A. P. (1998). Getting past the latest “post”: Assessing the term “post-colonial.”
Critical Studies in Mass Communication, 15(1), 195-212. doi:
10.1080/15295039809367042

Kellner, D. (2005). The media and election 2004. Critical Studies in Media
Communication, 22(2), 178-186. doi: 10.1080/07393180500093794

Kim, I., & Dutta, M. J. (2009). Studying crisis communication from the subaltern studies
framework: Grassroots activism in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. Journal of
Public Relations Research, 21(2), 142-164. doi: 10.1080/10627260802557423

Kumar, S. (2014). Media, communication, and postcolonial theory. In R. S. Fortner, & P.
M. Fackler (Eds.), The handbook of media and mass communication theory (pp.
380-399). Retrieved from https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/rodlibraryebooks/detail.action?docID=1650862

100

Kovach, B., & Rosenstiel, T. (2001). The elements of journalism: What newspeople
should know and the public should expect. New York, NY: Crown Publishers.

Lee, B. K. (2005). Crisis, culture, and communication. In P. J. Kalbfleisch (Ed.),
Communication yearbook, 29. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Liska, C., Petrun, E. L., Sellnow, T. L., & Seeger, M. W. (2012). Chaos theory, selforganization, and industrial accidents: Crisis communication in the Kingston Coal
ash spill. Southern Communication Journal, 77(3), 180-197.
doi:10.1080/1041794X.2011.634479

Littlefield, R. S., & Quenette, A. M. (2007). Crisis leadership and Hurricane Katrina: The
portrayal of authority by the media in natural disasters. Journal of Applied
Communication Research, 35(1), 26-47. doi: 10.1080/00909880601065664

Littlejohn, S. W. (2002). Theories of human communication (7th ed.). Belmont, CA:
Wadsworth/Thomson Learning.

Liu, M., McIntyre, J. J., & Sellnow, T. (2008). Less ambiguity and more hope: The use of
narrative in Chinese newspaper reports on the SARS crisis. In M. W. Seeger, T.
L. Sellnow, & R. R. Ulmer (Eds.), Crisis communication and the public health
(pp. 111-130). Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.
Mădroane, I. A. (2012). Roma, Romanian, European: A media framed battle over
identity. Critical Approaches to Discourse Analysis across Disciplines, 5(2), 102119.

Manik, J. A., & Najar. N. (2015, June 1). Bangladesh police charge 41 with murder over
Rana Plaza collapse. The New York Times. Retrieved from
http://www.nytimes.com

Manik, J. A., & Yardley. J. (2012, December 17). Bangladesh factory fire caused by
gross negligence. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com

101

McHale, J. P., Zompetti, J. P., & Moffitt, M. A. (2007). A hegemonic model of crisis
communication: Truthfulness and repercussions for free speech in Kasky v. Nike.
Journal of Business Communication, 44(4), 374-402. doi:
10.1177/0021943607306137

Meadows, L. (2014). Creating, sustaining, or dispelling misconceptions: Discourse
analysis of mainstream print media’s coverage of Obama’s religious identity.
Journal of Media and Religion, 13(1), 138-152. doi:
10.1080/15348423.2014.909192

Meyer, M. (2001). Between theory, method and politics: Positioning of the approaches to
CDA. In R. Wodak & M. Meyer (Eds.), Methods of critical discourse analysis
(pp. 14-31). London, England: Sage.

Millner, A. G., Veil, S. R., & Sellnow, T. L. (2011). Proxy communication in crisis
response. Public Relations Review, 37(1), 74-76.
doi:10.1016/j.pubrev.2010.10.005

Mumby, D. K. (1997). Modernism, post-modernism and communication studies: A
rereading of an ongoing debate. Communication Theory, 7(1), 1-28.
10.1111/j.1468-2885.1997.tb00140.x

Munshi, D., & Kurian, P. (2005). Imperializing spin cycles: A postcolonial look at public
relations, greenwashing, and the separation of publics. Public Relations Review,
31(1), 513-520. doi: 10.1016/j.pub.rev.2005.08.010

Murphy, P. D. (2003). Without ideology? Rethinking hegemony in the age of
transnational media. In L. Artz & Y. R. Kamalipour (Eds.), The globalization of
corporate media hegemony (pp. 3-32). Albany, NY: State University of New
York Press.

Nayar, P. K. (2010). Postcolonialism: A guide for the perplexed. London, England:
Continuum.

Parry, B. (2013). Edward Said and third-world Marxism. College Literature, 40(4), 105126. doi: 10.1353/lit.2013.0040

102

Rao, S. (2011). The “local” in global media ethics. Journalism Studies, 12(6), 780-790.
doi: 10.1080/1461670X.2011.614818

Richardson, B., & Langford, R. (2015). A shifting collective identity: A critical discourse
analysis of the child care advocacy association of Canada’s public messaging in
2005 and 2008. Critical Discourse Studies, 12(1), 78-96.
doi: 10.1080/17405904.2014.962068.

Said, E. (1978). Orientalism. New York, NY: Vintage.

Scheufele, D. A., & Tewksbury, D. (2007). Framing, agenda setting, and priming: The
evolution of three media effects models. Journal of Communication, 57(1), 9-20.
doi: 10.1111/j.0021-9916.2007.00326.x

Scheufele, D. A., & Tewksbury, D. (2010). In P. D’Angelo & J. A. Kuypers (Eds.).
Doing news framing analysis: Empirical and theoretical perspective (pp. 331356). New York, NY: Routledge.

Seeger. M. W., Sellnow, T. L., & Ulmer, R. R. (2003). Communication and
organizational crisis. Westport, CT: Praeger.

Sellnow, T. L., & Seeger, M. W. (2013). Theorizing in crisis communication. Malden,
MA: Wiley-Blackwell.

Sellnow, D. D., & Sellnow, T. L. (2014). The challenge of exemplification in crisis
communication. Journal of Applied Communications, 98(2), 53-64.

Shome, R., & Hegde, R. (2002). Postcolonial approaches to communication: Charting the
terrain, engaging the intersections. Communication Theory, 12(3), 249-270. doi:
10.1111/j.1468-2885.2002.tb00269.x

Sing, C. S. (2011). The ideological construction of European identities: A critical
discourse analysis of the linguistic representation of the old vs. new Europe
debate. In C. Hart (Ed.), Critical discourse studies in context and cognition
(pp. 143-169). Philadelphia, PA: John Benjamins.

103

Smith, F. M., Coffelt, T. A., Rives, A. P., & Sollitto, M. (2012). The voice of victims:
Positive response to a natural disaster crisis. Qualitative Research Reports in
Communication, 13(1), 53-62. doi:10.1080/17459435.2012.719209
Smithson, J., & Venette, S. (2013). Stonewalling as an image-defense strategy: A critical
examination of BP’s response to the Deepwater Horizon explosion.
Communication Studies, 64(4), 395-410. doi: 10.1080/10510974.2013.770409

Spence, P., Lachlan, K., Lin, X., Sellnow-Richmond, D., & Sellnow, T. (2015). The
problem with remaining silent: Exemplification effects and public image.
Communication Studies, 66(3), 341-357. doi: 10.1080/10510974.2015.1018445

Sriramesh, K. (1996). Power distance and public relations: An ethnographic study of
southern Indian organizations. In H. M. Culbertson, & N. Chen (Eds.),
International public relations: A comparative analysis (pp. 191-206). Mahwah,
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Tewksbury, D., & Scheufele, D. A. (2009). News framing theory and research. In J.
Bryant, & M. B. Oliver (Eds.), Media effects: Advances in theory and research
(pp. 17-33). New York, NY: Routledge.

Thombre, A. (2008). Organizing multiple HIV and AIDS discourses for engaging crisis
communication in India. In M. W. Seeger, T. L. Sellnow, & R. R. Ulmer (Eds.),
Crisis communication and the public health (pp. 179-199). Cresskill, NJ:
Hampton Press.

Tian, Y., & Stewart, C. M. (2005). Framing the SARS crisis: A computer-assisted text
analysis of CNN and BBC Online news reports of SARS. Asian Journal of
Communication, 15(3), 289-301. doi: 10.1080/01292980500261605

Tyler, L. (2005). Towards a postmodern understanding of crisis communication. Public
Relations Review, 31(1), 506-571. doi: 10.1016/j.pub.rev.2005.08.017

van Dijk, T. A. (1988). News as discourse. Hillsdale, NJ: L. Erlbaum Associates.

104

van Dijk, T. A. (1993). Principles of critical discourse analysis. Discourse and Society,
4(2), 249-283.

van Dijk, T. A. (2001). Critical discourse analysis. In D. Schiffrin, D. Tannen, & H. E.
Hamilton (Eds.), The handbook of discourse analysis (pp. 352-371). Malden, MA:
Blackwell Publishers.

Veil, S. R., & Odeja, F. (2010). Establishing media partnerships in crisis response.
Communication Studies, 61(4), 412-429. doi: 10.1080/10510974.2010.491336

Waymer, D., & Heath, R. L. (2007). Emergent agents: The forgotten publics in crisis
communication and issues management research. Journal of Applied
Communication Research, 35(1), 88-108. doi: 10.1080/00909880601065730

Wakefield, R. I. (1996). Interdisciplinary theoretical foundations for international public
relations. In H. M. Culbertson, & N. Chen (Eds.), International public relations:
A comparative analysis (pp. 17-30). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Wiesman, P. (2011). We frame to please: A preliminary examination of The Daily
Show’s use of frames. In T. Goodman (Ed.), The Daily Show and rhetoric:
Arguments, issues, and strategies (pp. 131-152). New York, NY: Lexington
Brooks.

Wodak, R. (2001). What CDA is about – a summary of its history, important concepts,
and its developments. In R. Wodak & M. Meyer (Eds.), Methods of critical
discourse analysis (pp. 1-13). London, England: Sage.

Wodak, R., & Busch, B. (2004). Approaches to media texts. In J. Downing et al. (Eds.),
Handbook of media studies (pp. 105-122). London, England: Sage.

Yardley. J. (2013, May 22). Report on deadly factory collapse in Bangladesh finds
widespread blame. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com

105

Yum, J. O. (1988). The impact of Confucianism on interpersonal relationships and
communication patterns in East Asia. Communication Monographs, 55(1), 374388. doi: 10.1080/03637758809376178

106

APPENDIX A
A LIST OF SELECTED POST-RANA PLAZA COLLAPSE REPORTS, FEATURES,
AND EDITORIALS IN SELECTED U.K. AND U.S. NEWSPAPERS
(In order of publication dates — from the oldest to the newest)

01.
02.

Date

Headline

Newspaper

04/26/2013

Outrage builds after collapse in
Bangladesh

New York
Times

Cries from the rubbles: ‘Save us brother, I
beg you. I want to live’

Guardian

--

03.

04/27/2013

Bangladeshis burn factories to protest
conditions

New York
Times

04.

04/29/2013

Garment factory death toll rises as is
arrested while trying to flee to India

Guardian

Tears and rage as hope fades in
Bangladesh

New York
Times

Retailers split on contrition after collapse
of factories

New York
Times

05.
06.

-05/01/2013

07.

--

The most hated Bangladeshi, toppled from New York
a shady empire
Times

08.

--

Bangladesh discarded rescue cameras

Telegraph

Bangladesh arrests engineer who warned
of dangers

New York
Times

British retailers failed to sign up to safety
rules in Bangladesh factory

Telegraph

09.
10.

05/03/2013
--

11.

05/04/2013

Disaster raises pressure for labor reform

Washington
Post

12.

05/11/2013

17 days in darkness, a cry of ‘save me,’
and joy

New York
Times

13.

05/14/2013

Global retailers join safety plan for
Bangladesh

New York
Times
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14.
15.

05/15/2013
--

Wal-Mart won’t sign Bangladesh accord

Washington
Post

Inhuman conditions (editorial comment)

Washington
Post

16.

05/17/2013

Groups press big retailers on safety
overseas

New York
Times

17.

05/23/2013

Report on deadly factory collapse in
Bangladesh finds widespread blame

New York
Times

18.

05/31/2013

Grim task overwhelms Bangladeshi DNA
lab

New York
Times

19.

06/04/2013

Engineers warn 60% of garment industry Guardian
buildings in Bangladesh at risk of collapse

20.

06/06/2013

Bangladesh: Police fire at protest by
collapsed factory staff

Guardian

Bangladesh garment industry under
scrutiny following factory collapse

Guardian

21.

--

22.

06/07/2013

Alive but alone: Survivors of factory
disaster stitch together broken lives

Guardian

23.

06/08/2013

Primark says factory victims will soon see
cash

Guardian

24.

06/30/2013

Justice elusive in Bangladesh factory
disaster

New York
Times

25.

07/03/2013

After disaster, Bangladesh lags in policing New York
its maze of factories
Times

26.

07/04/2013

Government says retailers must help raise
factory standards

Guardian

27.

09/08/2013

Factory disaster haunts survivors and
rescuers

Washington
Post

28.

10/23/2013

Rana Plaza factory disaster: Victims still
waiting for compensation

Guardian

29.

11/23/2013

U.S. retailers decline to aid factory
victims in Bangladesh

New York
Times
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30.

11/30/2013

Christmas help for Rana Plaza victims

Guardian

31.

12/19/2013

After Bangladesh factory collapse, bleak
struggle for survivors

New York
Times

32.

12/24/2013

$40 million in aid set for Bangladesh
garment workers

New York
Times

33.

12/31/2013

Clothing brands sidestep blame for safety
lapse

New York
Times

34.

02/24/2014

First companies give fund for victims of
Bangladeshi clothing factory collapse

New York
Times

35.

03/16/2014

Rana Plaza victims still awaiting
compensation

Guardian

36.

03/17/2014

Workers still in fear but garment industry
is thriving

Guardian

Primark pays $10m more to Rana Plaza
victims

Guardian

37.

--

38.

03/20/2014

Rana Plaza victims to get £1.2m in first
payment

Guardian

39.

03/28/2014

US retailers’ donation to Bangladesh fund
‘paltry’

Guardian

40.

03/29/2014

3 retailers give aid to Bangladesh workers

New York
Times

41.

04/16/2014

UN Rana Plaza fund still two-thirds short
of target

Guardian

42.

04/24/2014

The fashion trade and the child labourer
whose life was blighted in Rana Plaza

Telegraph

43.

04/28/2014

One year after Rana Plaza

New York
Times

44.

06/19/2014

Rana Plaza disaster: Call for UK to press
retailers over compensation fund

Guardian

45.

06/26/2014

Minister urges retailers to pay into Rana
Plaza fund

Guardian
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46.
47.

07/28/2014
--

Matalan refuses to fund UN scheme for
Rana Plaza victims

Guardian

Campaigners target Matalan over disaster
fund

Telegraph

48.

07/31/2014

Matalan makes late payment to Rana
Plaza fund

Guardian

49.

10/24/2014

Unraveling a peril (Editorial comment)

Washington
Post

50.

04/23/2015

Rana Plaza collapse: Compensation fund
has $6m shortfall two years on

Guardian

51.

04/24/2015

Two years after Rana Plaza, have
conditions improved in Bangladesh’s
factories?

Guardian

Bangladesh battles back from factory
collapse

Washington
Post

Bangladesh Rana Plaza factory fund
finally meets target

Guardian

52.
53.

-06/11/2015
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APPENDIX B
A LIST OF SELECTED POST-RANA PLAZA COLLAPSE REPORTS, FEATURES,
AND EDITORIALS IN SELECTED BANGLADESHI NEWSPAPERS
(In order of publication dates — from the oldest to the newest)
Date

Headline

Newspaper

01.

04/25/2013

Rana Plaza had no RAJUK approval

New Nation

02.

04/26/2013

BGMEA demands death to culprits

New Nation

03.

--

Counting dollars at the expense of workers Financial Express

04.

--

Savar tragedy triggers outcry worldwide

Financial Express

05.

04/27/2013

Govt in the dock for its incompetence

New Nation

06.

04/28/2013

Voice for justice gets louder

New Nation

Savar building collapse a man-made
disaster

Financial Express

Rana arrested from Benapole

Financial Express

Owners fear unrest as factories open today

Financial Express

07.
08.
09.

-04/29/2013
--

10.

04/30/2013

Rana placed on 15-day remand

New Nation

11.

05/01/2013

Arrest local MP Murad Jong

New Nation

Vested quarter out to destroy RMG
industry, says BGMEA

Financial Express

Rana Plaza engineer held

New Nation

Rana Plaza tragedy: Savar Poura
(municipality) mayor suspended

New Nation

Shop owners become paupers

New Nation

Hard lessons from Savar tragedy

Financial Express

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

-05/03/2013
-05/04/2013
-05/15/2013

Victims’ families for capital punishment to New Nation
Sohel Rana
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18.
19.
20.

-05/23/2013
--

CCC estimates 54m euros compensation
for Rana Plaza victims

Financial Express

Probe panel finds 5 reasons

New Nation

Life sentence for Rana Plaza factory
owners recommended

Financial Express

21.

05/26/2013

Pay for pain, sufferings

New Nation

22.

05/27/2013

US under lot of pressure over GSP facility

New Nation

23.

05/28/2013

BD must avoid Rana Plaza incident in
future: Mozena

Financial Express

24.

05/30/2013

Canadian Loblaw outlines plan to help
RMG workers

Financial Express

25.

06/01/2013

Compensation money eludes families of
Rana Plaza victims

Financial Express

26.

06/06/2013

UK offer for RMG sector reform

New Nation

27.

06/09/2013

Primark begins paying compensation

New Nation

28

06/27/2013

BGMEA holds Rana Plaza, 5 RMG
owners responsible for disaster, shirks its
responsibility

Financial Express

29.

07/06/2013

RMG exports up over 16pc in April-May
this year

Financial Express

30.

07/15/2013

Are RMG buildings safe to operate?

New Nation

31.

07/25/2013

CCC calls meeting of brands in BD to fix
compensation for victims

Financial Express

32.

12/08/2013

GSP suspension & Bangladesh RMG
sector

New Nation

33.

09/03/2013

US won’t buy apparels stained with BD
workers’ blood: Mozena

Financial Express

34.

09/09/2013

Pressure rising on brands to sign BD
safety accord

Financial Express

35.

09/14/2013

Two British MPs call for RMG workplace
safety

Financial Express
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36.

10/23/2013

ACC not yet taken any action against Rana New Nation

37.

10/24/2013

Compensation for Rana Plaza tragedy
victims still a far cry

Financial Express

38.

01/21/2014

Tk 1.45m for each of the dead, missing,
disabled

Financial Express

39.

02/14/2014

All attention to GSP action plan

New Nation

40.

03/12/2014

Safety problems still need to be resolved

New Nation

41.

03/23/2014

European parliamentary team arrives
tomorrow to assess post-Rana progress

Financial Express

42.

04/17/2014

Compensations continue to elude Rana
Plaza victims

Financial Express

43.

04/20/2014

Global buyers not raising prices despite
compliance: BGMEA

Financial Express

44.

04/22/2014

Disbursement of donations not transparent

New Nation

45.

04/25/2014

Tears for dead and maimed comrades

New Nation

46.

10/03/2014

1,587 Rana Plaza victims get help from
ILO-managed fund

Financial Express

47.

12/22/2014

Compensation estimate cut by $10m

Financial Express

48.

04/22/2015

No major progress in compensation

Financial Express

49.

04/25/2015

Tears for Rana Plaza victims

New Nation

